Re: [Pce] WG Last Call for draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang-19

Hi Tom, WG,

I was about to send a note to the WG but you beat me to it. You made a
valid point regarding TLS 1.3. But I suggest a different approach.

RFC 8253 states that TLS v1.2 or "later" is supported for PCEP. IMHO, a
draft fixing the issues with TLS 1.3 for PCEPS is a much better idea than
saying no TLS 1.3. Sean, Russ and I published -
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13-00.html. Note that a
similar effort is also being made in NetConf WG.

Coming to the PCEP-YANG, I plan to add a section in the draft that would
talk about how to enable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 for PCEP. Thoughts?

Thanks!
Dhruv (co-author hat on, co-chair hat off)

On Fri, Oct 7, 2022 at 2:25 PM tom petch <ietfc@btconnect.com> wrote:

> From: Pce <pce-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of tom petch <
> ietfc@btconnect.com>
> Sent: 03 October 2022 11:02
>
> From: Pce <pce-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of julien.meuric@orange.com <
> julien.meuric@orange.com>
> Sent: 26 September 2022 14:01
>
> Hi PCE WG,
>
> This message starts a 2-week WG Last Call for
> draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang-19. Please review and share any feedback using
> the PCE mailing list.
> This WGLC will end on Tuesday October 11.
>
> <tp>
> There are several little problems with this I-D, which I will post in due
> course, but one big one that I think needs outside assistance and will take
> time to resolve, namely the lack of security.
>
> This imports netconf-tls groupings and the netconf  I-D says basically
> security is nothing to do with us, that is up to the user of the grouping.
> It recommends TLS1.3 and says TLS1.2 is obsolete and not recommended.
>
> Trouble is, for most users TLS1.3 is not recommended because it is
> insecure because it introduces new features which are fine for web access
> and dangerous for almost other cases (eg early data).  There are a number
> of IETF documents looking at this and nailing down all the things you must
> not do with TLS1.3 in an operational environment (which is what most of the
> IETF is about).  RFC9190 section 2 is an example of what I mean but from
> tracking the evolution of that RFC I suspect that that got watered down by
> the supporters of TLS1.3.
>
> This I-D needs the equivalent (or else a MUST NOT for TLS1.3!).  Many of
> those involved with security in the IETF will not understand the issue, how
> dangerous TLS1.3 is for anything other than web access.
>
> <tp2>
> I note the submission of draft-dhody ... TLS13.
>
> I wonder what that plan is; for pcep-yang to ban TLS1.3 and have a
> reference to this I-D? or what?
>
> I think that PSK need more treatment.  My take is that RFC8446 bans PSK
> except when used for resumption where a session has been set up using
> certificates.  I see two documents addressing this issue, - 9257, 9258 -
> but I have yet to read them.
>
> Tom Petch
>
>
> Tom Petch
>
> Thanks,
>
> Julien
>
>
>
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