Re: [Pearg] comments on draft-irtf-pearg-safe-internet-measurement-08

Mallory Knodel <mknodel@cdt.org> Mon, 14 August 2023 15:31 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:30:54 -0400
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To: Craig Partridge <craig.partridge@colostate.edu>, pearg@irtf.org
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From: Mallory Knodel <mknodel@cdt.org>
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Subject: Re: [Pearg] comments on draft-irtf-pearg-safe-internet-measurement-08
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Thanks a lot, Craig.

Where there is not agreement or consensus we would still like to 
document that these issues should be considered.

I'll add these three points to the document and push a new version to 
the datatracker soon,

-Mallory

On 8/3/23 9:44 AM, Craig Partridge wrote:
> An IRTFer reached out and asked me if I'd comment on this draft, given 
> Mark Allman and I wrote a paper for Communications of the ACM several 
> years ago on this topic (copy attached).
>
> It is a useful draft.  I see a few gaps in it.
>
> First, it does not deal with sharing of measurement data. Sharing of 
> data sets (or making them available to reviewers) is increasingly 
> expected.  Ensuring that the data is protected and that users whose 
> information may be in the data set (even unknowingly -- we note that 
> timing analyses have gotten better over time, so data you thought was 
> OK, can be used to harvest unexpected information) are protected is 
> important.  One needs to be clear (and if the draft says this and I 
> missed it, my bad) researcher sharing the data is responsible for 
> thinking about such questions and ensuring safety would help. Second, 
> some of the information the draft suggests removing may make it harder 
> for third parties to audit data and I believe we need to think more 
> carefully about that question.
>
> Second, a lot of the concerns about active measurement center around 
> implied consent.  A number of thoughtful observers felt that efforts 
> in the mid-2010s to understand censorship systems placed unknown 
> individuals at risk (the experiments involved trying to send forbidden 
> information to random IP addresses within the censored space -- with 
> no knowledge of where those IP addresses were [e.g. someone's laptop] 
> and thus the possibility that an individual would be flagged by the 
> censorship system as a possible consumer of forbidden information). I 
> think the community still lacks a consensus, but perhaps a good 
> starting point is that implied consent is not acceptable for active 
> measurements that may cause harm to individuals.  This allows active 
> measurement of infrastructure (web servers, etc.) but prohibits 
> sending active measurements to individual's devices (laptop, phone, 
> smart watch, etc.).  This would conform with Kantian edicts not to use 
> a person for your ends without their consent.
>
> Third, it does not deal with using data previously collected by others 
> using questionable techniques. (This relates to the first point).  I 
> note that, again, the larger community does not agree on this topic.  
> (The medical community still uses data taken in concentration camps in 
> the 1940s).  But, at minimum, a recommendation to disclose that the 
> data set is a subject of ethical concern makes sense.
>
> I would also emphasize that a lot of these rules are starting points.  
> A thoughtful experimental protocol, reviewed by others, may find 
> better answers that enable certain important experiments.
>
> Hoping this is useful,
>
> Craig
>
>
-- 
Mallory Knodel
CTO, Center for Democracy and Technology
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780