RE: Sad situation!!!

"michel (m.) ranger" <rangerm@entrust.com> Thu, 03 October 1996 23:13 UTC

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From: "michel (m.) ranger" <rangerm@entrust.com>
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Subject: RE: Sad situation!!!
Date: Thu, 03 Oct 1996 16:53:50 -0400
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Comments below:

>----------
>From: 	dave_d%systrends.com@bnr400[SMTP:dave_d%systrends.com@bnr400]
>Sent: 	Thursday, October 03, 1996 9:55 AM
>To: 	Michel Ranger; 'kent%bbn.com%bnr400'; 'fha%dde.dk%bnr400'
>Cc: 	'pem-dev%tis.com%bnr400'; 'iesg%ietf.org%bnr400';
>'smime-dev%rsa.com%bnr400'; 'resolving-security%imc.org%bnr400';
>ietf-ediint%imc.org@bnr400
>Subject: 	RE: Sad situation!!! 
>
>Thanks Michel for the clarification on Entrust.  
>
>I guess I was thinking of the headline on the press release from RSA (see
>below) when I equated Entrust with S/MIME.
>
>BTW - Is your toolkit for S/MIME available now?
Limited Beta sites now, will expand shortly.
>  And does it/will it
>encorporate the change that Steve Dusse reported:
Yes.

><<<QUOTE>>>>
>Thanks for your interest in S/MIME.  Your opinion about the confidentiality 
>of the signature is shared by others and has been well-voiced in the S/MIME 
>community.  You may be interested to know that in the latest draft of the 
>S/MIME Implementation Guide (circulated to the S/MIME developer's list 
>about a month ago) there was a significant change to address this point.  
>
>The (new) default mechanism for providing a signed and enveloped message in 
>S/MIME is to first sign the message then envelope the entire signed 
>message, thereby hiding the signature.  With this change, I believe a 
>number of companies are considering S/MIME for protection of EDI and other 
>sensitive applications.
><<<END-QUOTE>>>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>NORTHERN TELECOM (NORTEL) ENDORSES S/MIME
>SPECIFICATION 
>
>ANAHEIM, California, April 30 -- Northern Telecom (Nortel) today announced,
>at the Electronic Messaging Association '96,its endorsement of the
>Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) specification for
>secure electronic message exchange between different secure communications
>systems.
>
>S/MIME, based on the RSA Public-Key Cryptography Standards, allows vendors
>to develop interoperable RSA-based security for various e-mail products so a
>message encrypted with one product can be decrypted by another.
>
>Nortel also announced its plans to develop a toolkit, for building S/MIME
>e-mail and messaging applications based on its leading Entrust encryption
>and digital signature software. Many companies are already using an Entrust
>toolkit to make their products ``Entrust-aware'' and plan to use the new
>Entrust S/MIME toolkit to allow for secure interoperability among
>messaging systems. The new toolkit is scheduled for availability in the
>third quarter of 1996.
>
>-0- 04/30/96 
>
>For further information: 
>Laura Teder, Nortel 214-684-8721,
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>----------
>At 11:54 AM 10/2/96 -0400, michel (m.) ranger wrote:
>>Just wanted to address some comments made about Nortel's Entrust.
>>
>>Michel
>>
>>
>>
>>>----------
>>>From: 	dave_d%systrends.com@bnr400[SMTP:dave_d%systrends.com@bnr400]
>>>Sent: 	Wednesday, October 02, 1996 8:39 AM
>>>To: 	kent%bbn.com@bnr400; fha%dde.dk@bnr400
>>>Cc: 	pem-dev%tis.com@bnr400; iesg%ietf.org@bnr400;
>>>smime-dev%rsa.com@bnr400;
>>>resolving-security%imc.org@bnr400
>>>Subject: 	Re: Sad situation!!!
>>>
>>>Stephen is right, Deming does indeed have an impressive product in its
>>>Secure Messenger.  I have tested the beta available through download and
>>>really like the key management features and the ability to choose
>>>encryption
>>>and digital signature algorithms on the fly.
>>>
>>>Another product I have tested and I know that has been adopted in at least
>>>one large corporation here in Phoenix for secure EDI/e-mail is Nortel's
>>>Entrust - also based on the S/MIME, RSA routines.
>>>
>>>Back to our old debate, however, I also agree that S/MIME is unacceptable
>>>for high confidentiality/security needs of financial EDI and some Health
>>>Care EDI.  This is due to the signature being outside the encryption
>>>envelope.  Since Deming's Secure Messenger and Nortel's Entrust are based
>>>on
>>>S/MIME I would not recommend them for use in EDI applications requiring
>>>high
>>>secrecy/confidentiality. 
>>Nortel's Entrust is not based on S/MIME, it supports S/MIME as one
>>of many security envoloping protocols and services that
>>run on the public key infrastructure.
>>
>>We focus on delivering key management, certificate management
>>and trust management for PKIs.  Application developers and end-customers
>>pick and choose what services they want through a number
>>of APIs and services. e.g. the app can put signatures inside the
>>encrypted envelope.
>>
>>To address your security/confidentiality concern, we have spent a lot of
>>time
>>ensuring our crypto module complies with FIPS 140.1 a US NIST
>>specification for 
>>security kernels and we have certification for our DES implementation.
>>This is a requirement for handling sensitive Gov't information
>>such as health records, among others.
>>
>>We also offer interfaces to optional, external crypto devices such as
>>smart cards and PCMCIA cards for those that want h/w assist.
>>
>>
>>------------------------------------------------
>>Michel Ranger                rangerm@entrust.com
>>tel: 613-763-8943            fax: 613-765-3520
>>http://www.nortel.com/entrust
>>
>>Entrust : Intranet/Internet Wide Encryption, Certificate and  Trust
>>Management.
>>
>>Entrust Validation String : F8HY-NCBE-DHXA
>>
>>
>>
>>
>======================================
>|   David Darnell              
>|   SysTrends, Inc.             
>|   Arizona EC/EDI Roundtable   
>|   1850 East Carver Road       
>|   Tempe, AZ 85284-2510 USA            
>|   Tel (602)838-5316           
>|   Fax (602)897-8032           
>|   mailto://dave_d@systrends.com        
>====================================== 
>
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