Re: [Perc] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08

["Paul E. Jones" <[e-mail]>]

Thanks!  I fixed those.

Paul

------ Original Message ------
From: "Shawn Emery" <[e-mail]>
To: "Paul E. Jones" <[e-mail]>
Cc: "secdir" <[e-mail]>; 
[e-mail]; [e-mail]; 
[e-mail]
Sent: 6/11/2021 12:20:25 AM
Subject: Re: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08

>
>Thank you for incorporating the requested changes into the Security 
>Considerations section.  Looks better.  A few more nits with the latest 
>update:
>
>s/the the/the/g
>s/"EndpointDisconect"/"EndpointDisconnect"/
>s/document rely/document relies/
>
>Shawn.
>--
>
>On Mon, Jun 7, 2021 at 4:50 PM Paul E. Jones <[e-mail]> 
>wrote:
>>Shawn,
>>
>>Thanks for the review.  Russ also had comments on the security
>>considerations section.  I have changed that substantially and welcome
>>any additional input.  See these changes:
>>
>>https://github.com/percwg/perc-wg/compare/paulej_ietf_lc
>>
>>Paul
>>
>>------ Original Message ------
>>From: "Shawn Emery via Datatracker" <[e-mail]>
>>To: [e-mail]
>>Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>[e-mail]
>>Sent: 6/6/2021 8:54:04 PM
>>Subject: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08
>>
>> >Reviewer: Shawn Emery
>> >Review result: Not Ready
>> >
>> >I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
>>ongoing
>> >effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  
>>These
>> >comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area 
>>directors.
>> >Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like 
>>any other
>> >last call comments.
>> >
>> >This draft specifies a DTLS tunneling protocol for Privacy-Enhanced 
>>RTP
>> >Conferencing (PERC).  This entails a key exchange between the 
>>conference
>> >end-points and the key distributor through a delegate, media 
>>distributor.
>> >
>> >The security considerations section does exist and describes that the 
>>media
>> >distributor does not introduce any additional security issues given 
>>that it is
>> >just on-path with the key exchange between the endpoint and the key
>> >distributor.  Secondly, the key material between the media 
>>distributor and key
>> >distributor is protected through the mutually authenticated 
>>connection between
>> >the two entities.  Thirdly, the meta data exchanged between the media
>> >distributor and key distributor is not sensitive information, but is 
>>still
>> >protected through the TLS connection.  I agree with the above 
>>assertions.
>> >Besides the concerns described in the genart review about the impact 
>>of key
>> >material disclosure, the authors should consider the various other 
>>forms of
>> >security issues against the protocol, such as downgrade/DoS attacks 
>>from
>> >profile negotiation, etc.  The section could list and simply refer to 
>>the base
>> >RFCs, 5764, 8871, etc., to provide remediation against these attacks.
>> >
>> >General comments:
>> >
>> >The example message flow and binary coding was helpful, thank you.
>> >
>> >Editorial comments:
>> >
>> >s/might might/might/
>> >s/!@RFC4566/RFC4566/g
>> >s/An value/A value/
>> >s/!@RFC8126/RFC8126/
>> >s/material This/material.  This/
>> >
>> >
>> >
>>