Re: [Perc] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08

[Shawn Emery <[e-mail]>]

Thank you for incorporating the requested changes into the Security
Considerations section.  Looks better.  A few more nits with the latest
update:

s/the the/the/g
s/"EndpointDisconect"/"EndpointDisconnect"/
s/document rely/document relies/

Shawn.
--

On Mon, Jun 7, 2021 at 4:50 PM Paul E. Jones <[e-mail]> wrote:

> Shawn,
>
> Thanks for the review.  Russ also had comments on the security
> considerations section.  I have changed that substantially and welcome
> any additional input.  See these changes:
>
> https://github.com/percwg/perc-wg/compare/paulej_ietf_lc
>
> Paul
>
> ------ Original Message ------
> From: "Shawn Emery via Datatracker" <[e-mail]>
> To: [e-mail]
> Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
> [e-mail]
> Sent: 6/6/2021 8:54:04 PM
> Subject: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-perc-dtls-tunnel-08
>
> >Reviewer: Shawn Emery
> >Review result: Not Ready
> >
> >I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing
> >effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
> >comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors.
> >Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any
> other
> >last call comments.
> >
> >This draft specifies a DTLS tunneling protocol for Privacy-Enhanced RTP
> >Conferencing (PERC).  This entails a key exchange between the conference
> >end-points and the key distributor through a delegate, media distributor.
> >
> >The security considerations section does exist and describes that the
> media
> >distributor does not introduce any additional security issues given that
> it is
> >just on-path with the key exchange between the endpoint and the key
> >distributor.  Secondly, the key material between the media distributor
> and key
> >distributor is protected through the mutually authenticated connection
> between
> >the two entities.  Thirdly, the meta data exchanged between the media
> >distributor and key distributor is not sensitive information, but is still
> >protected through the TLS connection.  I agree with the above assertions.
> >Besides the concerns described in the genart review about the impact of
> key
> >material disclosure, the authors should consider the various other forms
> of
> >security issues against the protocol, such as downgrade/DoS attacks from
> >profile negotiation, etc.  The section could list and simply refer to the
> base
> >RFCs, 5764, 8871, etc., to provide remediation against these attacks.
> >
> >General comments:
> >
> >The example message flow and binary coding was helpful, thank you.
> >
> >Editorial comments:
> >
> >s/might might/might/
> >s/!@RFC4566/RFC4566/g
> >s/An value/A value/
> >s/!@RFC8126/RFC8126/
> >s/material This/material.  This/
> >
> >
> >
>
>