[Perc] Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09: (with COMMENT)

Mirja Kühlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net> Tue, 19 February 2019 14:08 UTC

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From: Mirja Kühlewind <ietf@kuehlewind.net>
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Subject: [Perc] Mirja Kühlewind's No Objection on draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09: (with COMMENT)
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Mirja Kühlewind has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-perc-srtp-ekt-diet-09: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Just a quick clarification question:
Sec 4.2.1: "   Outbound packets SHOULD continue to use the old SRTP Master Key
for
   250 ms after sending any new key.  This gives all the receivers in
   the system time to get the new key before they start receiving media
   encrypted with the new key."
I assume that 250ms is selected under the assumption that longer RTTs are a
problem for interactive communication anyway? Or where does this value come
from?