Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices

Fernando Gont <> Fri, 14 October 2016 10:25 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39FEF1296F0 for <>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:58 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.358
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.358 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DATE_IN_PAST_06_12=1.543, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id C5Co_ZXhnXyN for <>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( [IPv6:2001:67c:27e4::14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CC131296F2 for <>; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 03:25:57 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [] (unknown []) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1A19681A4A; Fri, 14 Oct 2016 12:25:52 +0200 (CEST)
To: George Michaelson <>, Peter Saint-Andre - Filament <>
References: <> <> <>
From: Fernando Gont <>
Message-ID: <>
Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 01:20:13 -0300
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/45.3.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <>
Cc: "" <>, Dave Thaler <>
Subject: Re: [perpass] privacy implications of UUIDs for IoT devices
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "The perpass list is for IETF discussion of pervasive monitoring. " <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 10:25:58 -0000

On 10/05/2016 09:01 PM, George Michaelson wrote:
> As an example the IEEE MAC registry is really only to provide
> uniqueness, but its been demonstrated to act as a passive-capture
> mechanism to identify probable host architecture from on-the-wire
> sniffs. This then leads directly to: "If its a Dell, then I know the
> iDrac default password so I can attempt to see if this is a badly
> configured Dell which has iDrac IPMI on the host address" and like
> attacks.
> Unique identifiers are being used by the cellular provider to offer
> price differentiated service to people on the same basic substrate.
> Which is a poshed-up way of saying you can get a SIM which is dataplan
> for an iPad but if you put it in your phone you are in breach of
> contract over the use of that SIM. I am not personally a fan of this
> legalism, but it is legal, and it is an ism.
> I think there is a fundamental tension between baked in uniqueness,
> probabalistic uniqueness (think ULA) and non-unique state in Layer-2
> and Layer-3

Please see: draft-gont-numeric-ids-generation-01

Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492