Re: [perpass] Securing VoIP in the Presence of Pervasive Monitoring

[Marc Petit-Huguenin <[e-mail]>]

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On 09/09/2013 08:30 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
> Hi Brian, Dean,
> 
> RELOAD [1] is a bit of a gigantic spec though but I agree could be
> promising in this space. I wonder if anyone might be interested enough to
> write a draft saying how to use RELOAD to be more privacy friendly?

I wrote a draft adapting some of the ideas of TOR to RELOAD:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-petithuguenin-p2psip-reload-anonymous-02

That was presented in Atlanta:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/85/slides/slides-85-p2psip-1.pdf

Interestingly the reason for this draft was not end-user privacy, but to
prevent commercial entities to discovers competitors' customers in the context
of VIPR.

> 
> I've no idea if that'd be easy or a huge amount of effort for someone who
> already knows the protocol, but I'm pretty sure it'd be a major task for
> someone starting from scratch.
> 
> S.
> 
> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/p2psip/draft-ietf-p2psip-base/
> 
> On 09/09/2013 04:09 PM, Brian Rosen wrote:
>> I'm still worried about the role of the enrollment server.  If it got
>> compromised, then mischief would be possible (you may not know who you
>> are talking to).  I think MITM would be hard.
>> 
>> I think we need to come up with a new way to come up with credentials
>> that is less dependent on servers that are subject to co-opting by the
>> authorities.
>> 
>> It's a HECK of a lot better than conventional VoIP though.
>> 
>> Brian
>> 
>> On Sep 9, 2013, at 10:46 AM, Dean Willis <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> I think we can mostly get there with RELOAD, but the implementations
>>> are still pretty early.
>>> 
>>> On Sep 9, 2013 6:53 AM, "Hannes Tschofenig" <[e-mail]>
>>> wrote: Hi Linus,
>>> 
>>> thanks for the comments.
>>> 
>>> I have indeed skipped that topic. I will have to read into the Mumble
>>> project to see what security and privacy guarantees it provides.
>>> 
>>> My current conclusion from using VoIP/IM systems without using Tor is
>>> that you cannot really protect against collecting this transaction data
>>> (i.e., you have to at least trust the two VSPs, our own and then the
>>> VSP of your communication partner). While you can influence routing of
>>> the data traffic to a certain extend it does not work too well when
>>> your VSP is working against you.
>>> 
>>> With IM you could at least set up your own server (e.g., by using an
>>> XMPP server) but with VoIP that's more complicated because nobody else
>>> will accepted your connection attempts (as explained in the
>>> interconnection part of my write-up).
>>> 
>>> I will come back to you on that issue.
>>> 
>>> Ciao Hannes
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 09.09.2013 14:31, Linus Nordberg wrote: Hannes
>>> Tschofenig<[e-mail]>  wrote Mon, 09 Sep 2013 11:26:39
>>> +0300:
>>> 
>>> | http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/wp/?p=997 | | It contains a number of
>>> recommendations, which are addressed to VoIP | providers and vendors
>>> but have to be enforced by data protection | authorities. | | The
>>> recommendations unfortunately highlight some challenges...
>>> 
>>> Indeed. And still, I miss any mention on protection against collecting 
>>> data about who's talking to who.
>>> 
>>> Without claiming any expertise at all in this area, the closest thing
>>> to something implementing this that I've heard of is Mumble over Tor.
>>> Mumble [0] is not standardised AFAICT. The Guardian Project wrote [1]
>>> about this earlier this year. Some people seem to use it [2].
>>> 
>>> [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mumble_%28software%29 [1]
>>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO/Mumble 
>>> [2]
>>> https://guardianproject.info/2013/01/31/anonymous-cb-radio-with-mumble-and-tor/


- --
>>> 
Marc Petit-Huguenin
Email: [e-mail]
Blog: http://blog.marc.petit-huguenin.org
Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/petithug
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