Re: [perpass] Cops hate encryption but the NSA loves it when you use PGP

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Sun, 31 January 2016 18:53 UTC

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To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>, "Matthijs R. Koot" <matthijs@koot.biz>
References: <56ACE9FF.3080606@dcrocker.net> <56ACFFE5.5000506@cs.tcd.ie> <5295c0797c43debce5367771cd87fdfb.w00t@mrkoot.com> <394C9C42-5E56-4271-A90B-8486D4A16011@icsi.berkeley.edu>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: perpass@ietf.org, dcrocker@bbiw.net
Subject: Re: [perpass] Cops hate encryption but the NSA loves it when you use PGP
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Hi Nick,

I had a look at the slides and while it's hard to know
from just those, I didn't see too much that was new in
that so far. But maybe when you build some n/w monitoring
kit there may be more to report.

As far as using PGP goes, I'm nowhere near as pessimistic
as it you appear to be (from the slides). Given that much
SMTP is now transmitted over TLS, I think the opportunity
for the likes of NSA to record all the PGP ciphertext has
to be have been significantly diminished. (They can still
do it since much SMTP/TLS is still opportunistic but I hope
the significant transitions we have already seen from cleartext
to opportunistic ciphertext to mutually-authenticated
ciphertext continues to evolve in the right direction.)

And there is work on PGP being done now in the revived PGP
WG [1] - while that is starting with modest goals, (to just
update crypto), if that goes well, then there are some folks
who'd love to try extend the work to address the real issues
that exist with exposed non-body content. (I'm not calling it
meta-data, as there's really sooooo much in the envelope that
it's more than meta-data). I am sure that your (and other's)
assistance with that work would very much be appreciated.

So my take-aways here are:

- it'd be great if folks worked on measuring the proportion
and kind(s) of plain and ciphertext leaving/entering their
networks and developing tooling to help us figure out what
is a good next target to try to protect - reports on that
would be really interesting to see on this list

- more work on interpersonal messaging is needed, (e.g. with
PGP, but not only that), and any of us can help with that
simply by doing it.

Cheers,
S.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/openpgp


On 30/01/16 19:52, Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> 
>> On Jan 30, 2016, at 11:32 AM, Matthijs R. Koot <matthijs@koot.biz> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Stephen,
>>
>>> Anyone got a link to Nick's slides/paper?
>>
>> Slides (38MB .pdf):
>> http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/enigma_weaver.key.pdf
>>
>> Paper: does not exist (
>> https://twitter.com/ncweaver/status/693516094003281920 ).
>>
>> Video (20 min): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqnKdGnzoh0
>>
>> Regards,
>> Matthijs
> 
> And how the NSA can rip through PGP (like we know they rip through MS2)
> 
> https://medium.com/@nweaver/extra-unofficial-xkeyscore-guide-b8513600ad24#.83bkhqx1v
> 
> 
> --
> Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
> nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
> 510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
> PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc
>