Re: [perpass] "Guide to intranet protection"?

Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net> Thu, 28 November 2013 14:29 UTC

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Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2013 06:28:50 -0800
From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>
Organization: Brandenburg InternetWorking
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To: Norbert Bollow <nb@bollow.ch>, Eric Burger <eburger@cs.georgetown.edu>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] "Guide to intranet protection"?
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On 11/28/2013 3:47 AM, Norbert Bollow wrote:
> Yes, end-to-end encryption is absolutely essential.
>
> But protecting "who communicated with whom" data, which can also be
> highly sensistive, requires further steps in addition to end-to-end
> encryption.


I've been skeptical about the avid focus on using TLS, because it isn't 
end-to-end.   Object-based mechanisms, like PGP or TLS, are what's 
needed for that.

Then it was pointed out exactly the above, namely that these mechanisms 
protect little or none of the meta-data, whereas TLS does protect it 
(except within transit nodes,  between TLS sessions, of course)

d/

-- 
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net