Re: [perpass] draft-farrell-perpass-attack architecture issue

Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com> Tue, 14 January 2014 22:00 UTC

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Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2014 13:00:13 -0900
From: Melinda Shore <melinda.shore@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] draft-farrell-perpass-attack architecture issue
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On 1/14/14 12:45 PM, Fred Baker (fred) wrote:
> So the question in the shepherd's report should not be "tell me you
> thought about the EU Data Retention Initiative and whether your
> protocol's data identifies an individual". It should be "what
> personal, equipment, or session identifiers, encrypted or otherwise,
> are carried in your protocol? How might they be correlated with
> offline data or otherwise used to infer the identity or behavior of
> an individual?"

I agree - I think this is a useful framing, beyond the question
of actual traffic inspection.  It's pretty clear that there's
been a lot of data mining, as well, and we haven't thought very
carefully about what we may be leaking inadvertently.  This is
particularly a concern as efforts like geonet start to ramp
up.

Melinda