Re: [Pqc] [lamps] PQC X.509 115 Hackathon

Assuming X.509 is made to work with quantum-resistant crypto 
implementations, does that mean that, by consequence, IPsec and further 
down - IPv6, will become quantum-resistant?

Intuitively, I would think X.509 is just one little part of IPsec and 
there would be a need of more.  But I am not entirely sure.

For example, one would appreciate the entire chain of security overall. 
A quantum-resistant X.509 payload of an IPv6 packet with an MD5 AH 
signature would still be non-resistant overall, I would say.

Sorry if this message is too naïve about the respective technology.

Alex

Le 05/10/2022 à 03:00, Mike Ounsworth a écrit :
> Hi LAMPS and people interested in PQC!
> 
> As suggested at 114, my colleague John Gray and I would like to do a 115 
> Hackathon on PQ keys and signatures in X.509 / PKIX.
> 
> We are suggesting to play with Dilithium, Falcon, Sphincs+, and 
> Composite signing algorithms in Certs, CRLs, CSRs, PKCS#12s, CMS 
> SignedData, maybe OCSP Responses, maybe Timestamping, maybe CMP. We can 
> bring: the Entrust Toolkit (which we can hack at), Bounce Castle, 
> OpenQuantumSafe-openssl, OpenCA (easier if Max Pala is there, but we can 
> probably figure out how to build it).
> 
> The point of the hackathon, I think, is going to be OIDs, and public key 
> / private key formats (ex.: the differences between Dilithium and Falcon 
> encodings in draft-uni-qsckeys, and 
> draft-massimo-lamps-pq-sig-certificates).
> 
> Question 1: are others interested in joining us at the hackathon? (no 
> point is signing up for a hackathon spot if we’re the only ones there)
> 
> Question 2: whether or not you're joining, what PQ X.509 / PKIX things 
> would you like to see working with Dilithium, Falcon, Sphincs+, Composite?
> 
> ---
> Mike Ounsworth
> Software Security Architect, Entrust
> 
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