Re: [Pqc] [EXTERNAL] Re: [lamps] PQC X.509 115 Hackathon

[Mike Ounsworth <[e-mail]>]

Hi Alex,

Correct, X.509 is only part of the problem. Security protocols use crypto in various ways besides the X.509 certificates themselves. You raise the example that the protocol needs to support signature algorithms that are compatible with the provided X.509 certificate. For example IPSec can only make use of a Dilithium3 certificate if IPSec support the Dilithium3-SHA256 signature algorithm.

Another example is the key exchange portion of TLS- and IPSec-like handshakes. Both of those protocols have added mechanisms for hybrid key exchange so that they are ready to drop in the final NIST winner when it is ready [1], [2]. Of course, all security protocols need to do similar work; you don't get it for free by using PQ X.509.

If there are protocols that are not yet making enough progress on this, then go pester their respective working groups.


[1]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8784
[2]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design

---
Mike Ounsworth

-----Original Message-----
From: Pqc <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Alexandre Petrescu
Sent: October 21, 2022 4:42 AM
To: [e-mail]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Pqc] [lamps] PQC X.509 115 Hackathon

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Assuming X.509 is made to work with quantum-resistant crypto implementations, does that mean that, by consequence, IPsec and further down - IPv6, will become quantum-resistant?

Intuitively, I would think X.509 is just one little part of IPsec and there would be a need of more.  But I am not entirely sure.

For example, one would appreciate the entire chain of security overall.
A quantum-resistant X.509 payload of an IPv6 packet with an MD5 AH signature would still be non-resistant overall, I would say.

Sorry if this message is too naïve about the respective technology.

Alex


Le 05/10/2022 à 03:00, Mike Ounsworth a écrit :
> Hi LAMPS and people interested in PQC!
>
> As suggested at 114, my colleague John Gray and I would like to do a
> 115 Hackathon on PQ keys and signatures in X.509 / PKIX.
>
> We are suggesting to play with Dilithium, Falcon, Sphincs+, and
> Composite signing algorithms in Certs, CRLs, CSRs, PKCS#12s, CMS
> SignedData, maybe OCSP Responses, maybe Timestamping, maybe CMP. We
> can
> bring: the Entrust Toolkit (which we can hack at), Bounce Castle,
> OpenQuantumSafe-openssl, OpenCA (easier if Max Pala is there, but we
> can probably figure out how to build it).
>
> The point of the hackathon, I think, is going to be OIDs, and public
> key / private key formats (ex.: the differences between Dilithium and
> Falcon encodings in draft-uni-qsckeys, and
> draft-massimo-lamps-pq-sig-certificates).
>
> Question 1: are others interested in joining us at the hackathon? (no
> point is signing up for a hackathon spot if we’re the only ones there)
>
> Question 2: whether or not you're joining, what PQ X.509 / PKIX things
> would you like to see working with Dilithium, Falcon, Sphincs+, Composite?
>
> ---
> Mike Ounsworth
> Software Security Architect, Entrust
>
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