Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks through Version Negotiation (#4258)

[Martin Thomson <[e-mail]>]

@marten-seemann, trying to move discussion here.

You suggest that in a p2p deployment, the ability to control deployment of "server" instances is limited.

My response is that *in general* you need some sort of signaling between peers to communicate addresses for p2p.  NAT traversal generally requires it, and - if nothing else - you usually need to ship IP addresses for peers around.  Given that, I think that it is reasonable to include - in that signaling - information about supported protocols such that you should never need to generate a QUIC Version Negotiation in that context.

Maybe you don't care for that, but I think that it is probably better than accepting the exposure.

If you have an idea for how we might avoid this particular sort of request forgery without that, then I'm open to suggestions.  Right now, the proposal is that servers accept the risk and manage it.  But if there is a protocol change that would improve the situation, that might be better.  Assuming that it is minimally disruptive, of course.

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