Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks through Version Negotiation (#4258)
Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com> Fri, 06 November 2020 04:51 UTC
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Date: Thu, 05 Nov 2020 20:51:40 -0800
From: Marten Seemann <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks through Version Negotiation (#4258)
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> My response is that in general you need some sort of signaling between peers to communicate addresses for p2p. NAT traversal generally requires it, and - if nothing else - you usually need to ship IP addresses for peers around. This independent of NAT traversal then. You'd also need to advertise addresses in a world where NATs wouldn't exist, and you could include QUIC version information in those address advertisements. This still leaves the Bootstrap nodes susceptible to this attack (assuming you only hard-code a list of IP:ports without QUIC version information), but maybe that's ok, since you typically control those nodes yourself, or at least you can ask people running those nodes to take precautionary steps. -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/4258#issuecomment-722814278
- [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks thro… Christian Huitema
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks … Martin Thomson
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks … Marten Seemann
- Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Request Forgery Attacks … Jana Iyengar