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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] RESET_STREAM should be allowed in 0-RTT packets (#2344)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Tue, 22 January 2019 19:11 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] RESET_STREAM should be allowed in 0-RTT packets (#2344)
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Because the client here is an attacker.  However, I'm not seeing as much threat related to this specific change -- this is something the client can do regardless (generating many connections and causing state to be allocated for each).

So the attack here is to artificially create a large batch of (hopefully work-intensive) 0-RTT packets which are legitimate given a particular session ticket.  Then open a large set of parallel connections using the same session ticket and dump all those 0-RTT packets into each connection.

To guard against this, TLS 1.3 recommends [not accepting a given session ticket for multiple connections](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-8.1).  This defense is the same for QUIC, and lives in the TLS layer.

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