Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add normative language for stateless reset (#2574)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Mon, 01 April 2019 06:48 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Add normative language for stateless reset (#2574)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -2391,13 +2387,16 @@ the packet other than the last 16 bytes for carrying data.
 
 ### Detecting a Stateless Reset
 
-An endpoint detects a potential stateless reset when a incoming packet
-with a short header either cannot be associated with a connection,
-cannot be decrypted, or is marked as a duplicate packet.  The endpoint
-then compares the last 16 bytes of the packet with the Stateless Reset
-Token provided by its peer, either in a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame or
-the server's transport parameters.  If these values are identical,
-the endpoint MUST enter the draining period and not send any further
+An endpoint detects a potential stateless reset when a incoming packet with a
+short header either cannot be associated with a connection, cannot be decrypted,
+or is marked as a duplicate packet.  The endpoint MUST then compare the last 16
+bytes of the packet with all Stateless Reset Tokens provided by its peer, either

Is there a potential for abuse here: all stateless resets could be a lot?

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