Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Move and consolidate address validation (#1886)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Wed, 24 October 2018 03:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Move and consolidate address validation (#1886)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -1656,34 +1496,193 @@ One way that a new format could be introduced is to define a TLS extension with
 a different codepoint.
 
 
-## Stateless Retries {#stateless-retry}
-<!-- TODO: Move this section elsewhere. -->
+# Address Validation
+
+Address validation is used by QUIC to avoid being used for a traffic
+amplification attack.  In such an attack, a packet is sent to a server with
+spoofed source address information that identifies a victim.  If a server
+generates more or larger packets in response to that packet, the attacker can
+use the server to send more data toward the victim than it would be able to send
+on its own.
+
+The primary defense against amplification attack is verifying that an endpoint
+is able to receive packets at the transport address that it claims.  Address
+validation is performed both during connection establishment (see
+{{validate-new}}) and during connection migration (see {{migrate-validate}}).

In 7dc45966

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