Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Curtail CONNECTION_CLOSE for small Initial (#3292)

Martin Thomson <notifications@github.com> Mon, 09 December 2019 23:51 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Curtail CONNECTION_CLOSE for small Initial (#3292)
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martinthomson commented on this pull request.



> @@ -2486,7 +2486,16 @@ A client will always know whether the server has Handshake keys
 whether the client has Handshake keys.  Under these circumstances, a server
 SHOULD send a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in both Handshake and Initial packets
 to ensure that at least one of them is processable by the client.  These
-packets can be coalesced into a single UDP datagram (see {{packet-coalesce}}).
+packets can be coalesced into a single UDP datagram; see {{packet-coalesce}}.
+
+A CONNECTION_CLOSE frame that is sent in an Initial packet in response to
+unauthenticated information - the content of Initial or Handshake packets
+primarily - might result in denial of service for a legitimate connection.  QUIC
+does not include defensive measures for on-path attacks during the handshake
+(see {{handshake-dos}}). However, at the cost of reducing feedback about errors
+for legitimate peers, some forms of denial of service can be made more difficult
+for an attacker if endpoints discard illegal packets rather than terminating a

Good idea, but I'll add that elsewhere.

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