Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Path Challenge Padding and Amplification Protection (#4257)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Tue, 27 October 2020 06:17 UTC

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Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2020 23:17:50 -0700
From: Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Path Challenge Padding and Amplification Protection (#4257)
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Thank you for the calculations. Something around ~20x is what I have expected too.

I tend to agree that having some cautionary text is sufficient.

I'd also point out that we have a sentence that states: _In response to an apparent migration, endpoints MUST validate the previously active path using a PATH_CHALLENGE frame._ ([section 9.3.3](https://quicwg.org/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-transport.html#section-9.3.3-4)). Therefore, in addition to sending bytes to the victim, servers used for the reflection attack will be sending about 1/2 of that to the initiator of the attack. I'm not sure how critical that is to the attacker, though.

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