Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Remove DoS vector for spoofed connection migration (#2893)

[ianswett <[e-mail]>]

ianswett approved this pull request.

One editorial suggestion

> -INVALID_MIGRATION.  Similarly, an endpoint MUST NOT initiate migration if its
-peer supplies a zero-length connection ID as packets without a Destination
-Connection ID cannot be attributed to a connection based on address tuple.
-
-Not all changes of peer address are intentional migrations. The peer could
-experience NAT rebinding: a change of address due to a middlebox, usually a NAT,
-allocating a new outgoing port or even a new outgoing IP address for a flow.  An
-endpoint MUST perform path validation ({{migrate-validate}}) if it detects any
-change to a peer's address, unless it has previously validated that address.
+An endpoint also MUST NOT send packets from a different local address, actively
+initiating migration, if the peer sent the `disable_active_migration` transport
+parameter during the handshake. An endpoint which has sent this transport
+parameter, but detects that a peer has nonetheless migrated to a different
+network MUST either drop the incoming packets on that path without generating a
+stateless reset or proceed with path validation and allow the peer to migrate.
+This helps to prevent third parties in the network causing connections to close

This = Not generating a stateless reset?  If so, how about "Generating a stateless reset would allow third parties in the network to cause a connection to close by spoofing or other manipulation of observed traffic."?

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