Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] A day in the life (#3225)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Tue, 12 November 2019 13:52 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] A day in the life (#3225)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> +Each connection starts with a handshake phase, during which client and server
+establish a shared secret using the cryptographic handshake protocol
+{{QUIC-TLS}} and negotiate the application protocol.  The handshake
+({{handshake}}) confirms that endpoints are willing to communicate
+({{validate-handshake}}) and establishes parameters for the connection
+({{transport-parameters}}).
+
+An application protocol can also operate in a limited fashion during the
+handshake phase.  0-RTT allows application messages to be sent by a client
+before receiving any messages from the server.  However, 0-RTT lacks certain key
+security guarantees. In particular, there is no protection against replay
+attacks in 0-RTT; see {{QUIC-TLS}}.  Separately, a server can also send
+application data to a client before it receives the final cryptographic
+handshake messages that allow it to confirm the identity and liveness of the
+client.  These capabilities allow an application protocol to offer the option to
+trade some security guarantees for improved latency.

This section reads as if 1-RTT could be relaxed while it probably only intends to address 0-RTT.  See also #3224

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