Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Define an anti-forgery limit (#3620)

David Schinazi <> Fri, 22 May 2020 17:37 UTC

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Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 10:37:14 -0700
From: David Schinazi <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Define an anti-forgery limit (#3620)
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@DavidSchinazi approved this pull request.

Thanks for the edits!

> +successfully forge a packet; see {{AEBounds}} and {{ROBUST}}.
+For AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, and AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the limit on
+the number of packets that fail authentication is 2^36.  Note that the analysis
+in {{AEBounds}} supports a higher limit for the AEAD_AES_128_GCM and
+AEAD_AES_256_GCM, but this specification recommends a lower limit.  For
+AEAD_AES_128_CCM, the limit on the number of packets that fail authentication
+is 2^23.5; see {{ccm-bounds}}.
+: These limits were originally calculated using assumptions about the
+  limits on TLS record size. The maximum size of a TLS record is 2^14 bytes.
+  In comparison, QUIC packets can be up to 2^16 bytes.  However, it is
+  expected that QUIC packets will generally be smaller than TLS records.
+  Where packets might be larger than 2^14 bytes in length, smaller limits might

It would be really nice to do the math for 2^16 byte packets in this document, but I'm not volunteering so I guess I can live with this as is

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