Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2733)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Tue, 21 May 2019 09:34 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Allow reuse of stateless reset tokens (#2733)
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mikkelfj commented on this pull request.



> @@ -2476,6 +2476,14 @@ the same static key (see {{reset-oracle}}).  A connection ID from a connection
 that is reset by revealing the Stateless Reset Token MUST NOT be reused for new
 connections at nodes that share a static key.
 
+The same Stateless Reset Token MAY be used for multiple connection IDs on the
+same connection.  An endpoint that reuses a Stateless Reset Token MUST ensure
+that any connection ID used on the connection is matched to the active
+connection, including any routing performed at load balancers, even when a
+connection ID has been retired.  Otherwise, an attacker might be able to send a
+packet with a retired connection ID and cause the endpoint to produce a
+Stateless Reset.
+
 Note that Stateless Reset packets do not have any cryptographic protection.

I don't understand this text. I can see the issuer of the reset can and should coordinate with load balancers, but the text reads as if the sender is responsible for the receiver matching up the connection ID, or that an active connection should be matched sender side when the reset is transmitted to cancel an unknown connection, which by definition isn't possible. In part it is unclear what is mean by connection ID since there are two kinds.

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