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Re: KEYS_READY

Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 14 February 2019 04:24 UTC

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From: Jana Iyengar <jri.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 20:24:25 -0800
Message-ID: <CACpbDcfbEcg70RwpFrCQ2X6WA0Dd7ygd=Q0w7iwKc-ZgZQbZ0w@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: KEYS_READY
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
Cc: QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 8:12 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote:

> On Thu, Feb 14, 2019, at 14:47, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > Of course, if the KEY ACTIVE frame requires an acknowledgement, it
> > should arrive eventually. But what if it doesn't? What if the peer did
> > not send it, or did not correctly retransmit it? Should the endpoint
> > just abort the connection if some number of RTO pass after the phase
> > change, and the KEY ACTIVE frame has not been received yet? Does the
> > behavior change if some traffic encrypted with the new phase has been
> > acknowledged?
>
> I'm happy leaving this to implementation discretion.  There is no clear
> rule that say when you can treat the absence of the frame as an error,
> partly because your view of PTO is different than that of your peer.
>
> Maybe we can say that if you want to update and can't, you close the
> connection.  That's the usual advice anyway.
>

(I've left this comment on the PR as well, but seeing that this discussion
is happening here as well, echoing it here)
If the peer hasn't acked the previous KEYS_ACTIVE, it may not have seen it
yet. It is possible that it simultaneously did a key update and sent a
KEYS_ACTIVE however. Under this condition, the endpoint wouldn't be able to
update its keys again, since the peer may close the connection, right?

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