Re: KEYS_READY

Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com> Wed, 13 February 2019 22:10 UTC

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From: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 07:09:45 +0900
Message-ID: <CANatvzxoOFzpkcH_4VpQscpZq8ak0QL0D6REvyJVjE+ga97SVQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: KEYS_READY
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
Cc: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>, Marten Seemann <martenseemann@gmail.com>, Ian Swett <ianswett@google.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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2019年2月14日(木) 3:20 Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>:
>
>
>
> On Feb 13, 2019, at 5:55 AM, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> The point is that under the rules set by the PR, it is not possible to update keys before a KEYS_ACTIVE / KEYS_READY frame has been received. If such a frame is sent, but lost, there is not path to update keys again. This goes wrong after a (long) while, when the current key is exchausted.
> It does not matter that updates are rare.
>
>
> The more I look at it, the more I think that key update / key ready should be treated in much the same way as path challenge / path response.

I am not sure if I like that alternative, primary because it does not
seem right as a way to drop Initial, 0-RTT, Handshake keys. We are
trying to address two issues at once; how to drop those keys in lower
epochs, and how to do key update correctly.

The proposed approach of using a frame (or a header bit) to let each
side unilaterally declare that it's done with the keys gives us a
consistent pattern for switching between the keys.

> Something like: I just updated my key, can you receive it (challenge); yes, you can see I am using your new key (response). This resolves the debate with ack-or-not (not), and also whether the mechanism can be used to delay update ad infinitum (cannot).
>
> If we use the existing path challenge mechanism, we need to add a restriction that responses must be sent in the same epoch. Or we can invent a new one.
>
> -- Christian Huitema



-- 
Kazuho Oku