Proposed response to the 3GPP Liaison Statement

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Thu, 31 October 2019 01:10 UTC

Return-Path: <mnot@mnot.net>
X-Original-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: quic@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B2E412006D for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 18:10:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.701
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.701 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=mnot.net header.b=35crqIx9; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=messagingengine.com header.b=WEFiM7Pd
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1oIfJYnya81b for <quic@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 18:10:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from wout3-smtp.messagingengine.com (wout3-smtp.messagingengine.com [64.147.123.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86AAB12006B for <quic@ietf.org>; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 18:10:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from compute3.internal (compute3.nyi.internal [10.202.2.43]) by mailout.west.internal (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD81B557; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:10:05 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from mailfrontend1 ([10.202.2.162]) by compute3.internal (MEProxy); Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:10:05 -0400
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mnot.net; h=from :content-type:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:subject :message-id:date:cc:to; s=fm1; bh=NZlq2FHTP8FBV7KfL+TYKvuORsHUgn k4uLrAu1H7dAI=; b=35crqIx9vFrkQ8L1O4IwucuziAmsZ5vlHZG9ft94yCBbib FI3A9CebLrhbuw8xhA4oFsLOFVQgTWENdMBM+soGwQrgYCtKuDBRP0VD2+Y+rZ3p GXluf0h1v7oBT6NFqCD6gEYLmo68YxbpqHVTJz2fuO7+O+VMO31gYX5qzVej6VXR e1ypE1pGcPvmDj2Sy3/8jrCleCSrzwUiGfc8LNwPg792UrJmhD23OY16HEEPRXo2 n5JheLw1PEPLKGsF77+RADOz10S6OdbBbljelhfBqcdL4o/mGGzPrXSqBUSwhr/y v55qXqFORitjnHwhw/cHzEP+E3lQEdD6AZX+Acxg==
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d= messagingengine.com; h=cc:content-transfer-encoding:content-type :date:from:message-id:mime-version:subject:to:x-me-proxy :x-me-proxy:x-me-sender:x-me-sender:x-sasl-enc; s=fm1; bh=NZlq2F HTP8FBV7KfL+TYKvuORsHUgnk4uLrAu1H7dAI=; b=WEFiM7PdFGRGJiQ8UFBYLi hU8oP4h3uUFj+LM07G1+ZYOf/2RAqX9pCa7EgDxl3PraLg5jNXBE7NiA9aOwFX5i LqIlu8Ocu/OQMe+0YMPuCEu20UjWCmF57l5/SGgtzKGdXgtjnLz65TpylBQdtj/K ATUB3iGoU4TLbXS+sWRgT1pnfvEmRWW5ljFQqDA4jq2MybzyXozd/xN8CxOJ+zaz C9QoesGeBdQPNfVba4RmQyKtI9T954UlgyCSoxJqrLZsadkHA0fZahsO+HTVH2eh b2sNxkBmfW5xAEngHD110/5nJHLSSP5IT6a/UQmdLj7aVhmXUEsoJFNyJWV27u3A ==
X-ME-Sender: <xms:bDS6XUtXLl6oMksrU8XbYkVZGRqgDx8WaulfM10QfrX1IJsvTa38KA>
X-ME-Proxy-Cause: gggruggvucftvghtrhhoucdtuddrgedufedruddtgedgfedvucetufdoteggodetrfdotf fvucfrrhhofhhilhgvmecuhfgrshhtofgrihhlpdfqfgfvpdfurfetoffkrfgpnffqhgen uceurghilhhouhhtmecufedttdenucesvcftvggtihhpihgvnhhtshculddquddttddmne cujfgurhephfgtgfgguffkfffvofesthhqmhdthhdtvdenucfhrhhomhepofgrrhhkucfp ohhtthhinhhghhgrmhcuoehmnhhothesmhhnohhtrdhnvghtqeenucffohhmrghinhephh htthhpfedrihhnnecukfhppeduudelrddujedrudehkedrvdehudenucfrrghrrghmpehm rghilhhfrhhomhepmhhnohhtsehmnhhothdrnhgvthenucevlhhushhtvghrufhiiigvpe dt
X-ME-Proxy: <xmx:bDS6XVuCceC4e5zXfodR_jaV__aKZCqCr4yvoR-y74cC4NfgskXjDQ> <xmx:bDS6XawvAWOln4n1LLafw3Y9WL0oq0NWBjqRrLNgnfFssNINPC4VtQ> <xmx:bDS6Xbjd5GGo1gxdF8T2OWxW72898QBatWRpE_eTtfuoMMcTp72Yug> <xmx:bTS6XbfWSnWBxOsZbaDxri9_rkUFXOlTxBCT0kShRAa2j33L3wfE6A>
Received: from macbook-pro.mnot.net (unknown [119.17.158.251]) by mail.messagingengine.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 83CAB80063; Wed, 30 Oct 2019 21:10:02 -0400 (EDT)
From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.0 \(3594.4.19\))
Subject: Proposed response to the 3GPP Liaison Statement
Message-Id: <3218A80B-DAFD-43EF-8200-F99C660DF9C9@mnot.net>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:09:57 +1100
Cc: Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>
To: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3594.4.19)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/quic/L0I7ZLvUC6cwCRN6QbI8vJFfEdo>
X-BeenThere: quic@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Main mailing list of the IETF QUIC working group <quic.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/>
List-Post: <mailto:quic@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/quic>, <mailto:quic-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 01:10:09 -0000

QUIC WG participants,

Lars and I have discussed a response to this statement and plan on sending the message below. If you have comments, please respond to this e-mail by 6 November.

Regards,

~~~
Thank you for your input to our specifications.

Regarding the encryption of headers in addition to payload, this was a conscious design decision by the Working Group. Transport header encryption prevents modification by middleboxes, thereby avoiding ossification of the protocol, and also makes traffic analysis more difficult. The impact upon network operators was discussed extensively as part of that decision.

Regarding the spin bit, we believe that your characterisation is correct.

Regarding packet loss measurements, QUIC does support them, but only by the endpoints of communication -- not by third parties observing it. Keys may be exported by one of the endpoints to allow decoding of packet traces (e.g., with Wireshark), but that is not part of the QUIC standard.

Regarding performance analysis, it would be helpful if you described your use case in more detail. However, it's important to know that the Working Group decided early on that QUICv1 would focus on the use case of HTTP/3.

In turn, HTTP standardisation focuses primarily on the Web browsing use case; while we acknowledge that there are other uses of the protocol, and we accommodate them where possible, we cannot change the protocol in ways that harms that use. Exposing transport metadata would likely do so.

Kind regards,

Mark Nottingham and Lars Eggert, QUIC Working Group chairs
~~~