Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new obstacle?
Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Wed, 10 April 2019 19:56 UTC
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From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new obstacle?
To: "Gorry (erg)" <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Cc: "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>, Roberto Peon <fenix@fb.com>, "Border, John" <john.border@hughes.com>
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Let’s say China makes a deal with Google to allow their search engine (a not entirely unreasonably proposition). The Great Firewall of China (GFC) is reconfigured to accept traffic from a specific IP range for QUIC protocol v1. Google later upgrades to v2. GFC is updated. Later, out of ignorance, some other department within said company decides that its browsers should all use forced version aliases as a rule. GFC breaks. (Assuming Googles servers are not located within the demilitarised zone and users use Chrome). Alternative 1: Google up front decides to deploy forced version aliasing. China rejects the deal because they do not want to support random traffic through GFC. Alternative 2: Google up front decides to deploy forced version aliasing, and China does not reject the deal, out of ignorance. Later some department in China GFC oversight realises the deal and forces Google to remove forced version aliasing, or shut down its service. Alternative 3: Google up front decides to deploy forced version aliasing and China says, of course, we trust everything from Googles IP range. Alternative 4: Google realises that forced version aliasing does not work in the general case, and makes a special case for users within a certain geographical area. Disclaimer: I’m not affiliated with Google and this might not at all be how things would work, but it does highlight some of the challenges. Of course, to be fair, China is not the only government entity that might have a vested interest. Let's take a fictional example of US a real estate investor with heavy ties to the eastern european block who somehow finds himself elected as president needing to find leverage on trade negotiations without effectively hurting personal finances. It turns out that blocking certain digital services from said eastern european block is the perfect tool in the trade negotiations. Advisers point out that those services run heavily encrypted on the dark web with perpetual circulation of IP ranges so, ignoring any legal concerns, it would not be practically possible. Eventually someone figures out that these services all usually are at the forefront of technology and currently use QUIC v3.2 and no-one else has deployed that version yet, so it would suffice to ask NSA to tap into the backbone and disrupt specific packets. Of course, this ends up taking down the Bavarian local government election process in Germany where they are the first to use a new digital election system. Not that the is an issue, since trade negotiations are also running hot in that area, so that is just an accidental bonus. Or an endless number of other developments over the next few decades if the past few years is anything to go by. On 10 April 2019 at 20.13.59, Gorry (erg) (gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk) wrote: Thanks Mikkel, I do understand that various actors intentionally drop - but are you saying these actors would specifically choose to block a new version of QUIC ... I do not understand that assertion. Gorry On 10 Apr 2019, at 18:25, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> wrote: China blocks as a rule. Russia is running an experiment to block the rest of the internet. USA blocks net neutrality. EU blocks cookies. GB blocks itself. So blocking is not limited to what an operator considers best for business. On 10 April 2019 at 18.59.15, Border, John (john.border@hughes.com) wrote: I understand why people want to come down on the side of preventing ossification. But, things have changed. There are a lot of more negative consequences now when people unnecessarily block things. I think operators would put a lot of pressure on vendors to not do it now and to fix it if they did "by accident". Of course, I am only one operator. It would be nice to hear from others... John -----Original Message----- From: QUIC <quic-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Roberto Peon Sent: Wednesday, April 10, 2019 12:52 PM To: G Fairhurst <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>; quic@ietf.org Subject: Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new obstacle? WARNING: The sender of this email could not be validated and may not match the person in the "From" field. CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. You're kinda between a rock-and-a-hard-place either way: - We've seen how much fun ossification is in TCP and HTTP. If the thing is observable, it will be ossified seems to be the lesson. A lot of the reason why QUIC was started in the first place was because of the inability to improve TCP due to this ossification. - OTOH, there is the fear of unknown/unobservable which might cause operators to block things, whether predictably or not. My opinion is that it is better to start with preventing ossification, and then if that results in too large a percentage of operators blocking things, to re-evaluate. My guesses: IP+port tuples and traffic patterns are still observable (for better and worse), which implies operators will still have significant tools for managing traffic. I believe that these are acted on/matched (ML or not) regardless of any other data presented. In other words, I have a doubt that stating the version in an observable way will prevent the use of such tools. Most problems I've seen associated with implementations rather than protocol versions (though when the latter happens it is pretty severe). If you believe this assertion, then acting on protocol version is less interesting than attempting to act based on implementation fingerprints. -=R On 4/10/19, 1:48 AM, "QUIC on behalf of G Fairhurst" <quic-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk> wrote: Obscuring the version of a protocol seems like a major design design decision for wider use cases. So, I'm trying to understand the motivation for version greasing. (1) I know there were instances where some early versions of QUIC were blocked due to an uninitentional matching of the header. Is there evidence of intentional attempts to block updates to protocols? (2) Thinking about operating a network that cares about user support and protection from unwanted traffic, I would expect that there would be cases where traffic pattern anomolies are found and the appropriate thing would be to try to determine if a new protocol had been deployed and monitor it, if not, then the next most obvious thing could be to block all unexpected traffic, that seems like a decision to hide the version could increase ossification for new versions in these cases. (3) Similarly, if a threat is known to impact only a specific (older) version, it would seem to motivate a drop of that traffic that seeks to use that version, while still permitting other traffic. Forcing version detection to use pattern matching/ML will lead to less predictable outcomes, or blocking based on address, etc. (4) This obfusticates the most basic piece of reporting information used for support. It hides the extent of deployment of the current protocol version and prevlance of old implementations. (5) On the support, if a problem only emerges when a particular version is used with a particular address, then this helps pinpoint the issues. Matching client versions to servers is much more of an issue if the user community uses a wide range of servers (less so, I expect for major providers: google, facebook, etc, etc), but significant when there is a use of a diverse set of external sites and sites with their own load balancers, etc and a need to manage interactions with L2 services. I am intersted in knowing if this is likely to benefit or be a new obstacle? Gorry
- Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new obsta… G Fairhurst
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Roberto Peon
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Border, John
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Border, John
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Gorry (erg)
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Martin Thomson
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mirja Kuehlewind
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mirja Kuehlewind
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Ian Swett
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Christian Huitema
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Roberto Peon
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Roberto Peon
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… G Fairhurst
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Ted Hardie
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Martin Duke
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Salz, Rich
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Martin Duke
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Is "Version Greasing" a new benfit or a new o… Watson Ladd