Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pre-Singapore

Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Thu, 14 November 2019 10:27 UTC

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Subject: Re: Consensus Calls for Transport/TLS issues, pre-Singapore
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
Cc: Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>
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Kazuho pointed out that the MUST is a privacy concern for the client, so it
does make sense.

On 14 November 2019 at 09.51.12, Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen (mikkelfj@gmail.com)
wrote:

I added a comment to

 #3155: The method of identifying "the same server"


https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3156/files#r346186298

I’m not sure the MUST / SHOULD is correct in this case. Although I do agree
that server identify should not be limited to server certificates (I
proposed that myself).

Mikkel

On 14 November 2019 at 02.26.05, Mark Nottingham (mnot@mnot.net) wrote:

The following issues have proposals for resolution, and discussion so far
seems to support consensus to accept them. If you object, please do so on
the issue or in response to this message (changing the Subject
appropriately!). Absent any pushback, we'll direct the editors to
incorporate them late next week. Note that by default we won't discuss
these issues in Singapore, unless something comes up.

See <https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/projects/5> for the current
state of issues in the Late Stage process, itself defined at <
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md>.

* #3127: NEW_TOKEN and Retry tokens must be distinguishable
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3128

* #3158: Application close should be disallowed in Initial or Handshake
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3164

* #3155: The method of identifying "the same server"
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3156

* #2475: Invalid CONNECTION_CLOSE frames
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3231

* #3168: Allow servers to close connections immediately when the token is
corrupted
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3107

* #3194: reordered NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames with retired sequence numbers
shouldn't be used
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3202

* #3014: Handling of corrupt Retry packets
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3120

* #3095: Backoff of CONNECTION_CLOSE needs to be a MUST
Proposal: https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/pull/3157


--
Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/