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Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> Wed, 22 April 2020 14:55 UTC

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To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Cc: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
References: <49d8907c-7637-3d21-0619-4999565fc50e@gmail.com> <7C65B977-FA56-4118-BA8B-121BD9697F7C@island-resort.com>
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 16:54:57 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots
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On 2020-04-22 16:38, Laurence Lundblade wrote:
> Hi Anders,

Hi Laurence,
Thank you for responding!

> 
>> On Feb 27, 2020, at 9:51 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi List,
>> In the https://cyberphone.github.io/openbankingwallet project the idea was to use attestations.  The most recent version of the Android app indeed supports this as well.
>>
>> In an ideal world the root would be provided by Google.  However, since we don't live in an ideal world there are vendors out there who do not follow that "recipe”.
> 
> Are you referring to Android N Key Attestation that is implemented in the key store?

This is indeed one possible usage.
https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation

> 
>>
>> For W3C's PaymentRequest API a simpler solution is used which do not match attestations but is better than nothing.  This scheme builds on publishing a manifest associated with the app.  Here is my particular manifest:  https://mobilepki.org/w3cpay/method
>>
>> But I still would like to use attestations and also not being tied to browsers.
>>
>> What about making attestations optionally contain a URL to the root like https://huawei.com/teeroot ?
> 
> I don’t know what https://huawei.com/teeroot  is. I can’t get anything from this URL.

That's correct, I don't even know where to find Huawei's attestation root which is how I came to this idea :)


> I’m guessing you are after an X.509 root certificate, one that is used for Android-style attestation. Is that right?

Right.  Is using an X.509 root certificate an unusual way of dealing with attestation verification?

Anders

> 
> LL
> 
> 
>> Since the number of vendors in finite and the Web-PKI is in a fairly good shape these days, this could serve as a workaround for those who don't have any number of cycles to spend on installing arbitrary tee root certificates.  That is, a verifier's "trust registry" would simply hold host names like "huawei.com", "sony.com", "samsung.com", etc.
>>
>> If there is a better method, I'm all ears!
>>
>> thanx,
>> Anders
>>
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>

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