Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots
Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> Fri, 24 April 2020 03:32 UTC
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To: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Cc: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
References: <49d8907c-7637-3d21-0619-4999565fc50e@gmail.com> <7C65B977-FA56-4118-BA8B-121BD9697F7C@island-resort.com> <d67985a1-97da-3e23-81e6-1b58b61e1d1a@gmail.com> <FE63538E-389A-4F07-B8DB-6B875D27C3D0@island-resort.com>
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 05:31:57 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots
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On 2020-04-23 21:20, Laurence Lundblade wrote: > Hi Anders, > Hi Laurence; > I think using an X.509 hierarchy with EAT is a fine thing to do, but no one’s done it yet. I see it more like a workaround in the absence of a standard. Using CWTs is a better solution. The two EAT implementations I know of, use other means to find the verification key. One by key ID, another by a combination of claims inside the attestation. Somewhere there must be a trust anchor or a trusted public key, right? How do you locate it expressed in practical terms? This is the only thing the "Web PKI + Vendor URL" proposal was meant to addresses. For those who have doubts about automated retrieval of trust anchors based on vendor-specific host names, the scheme can also aid manual installation of such. The proposal is neutral with respect to key hierarchy. A flat or multi-level (as in Android) scheme would be dealt with in the same way. Anders > > Android’s solution is not standard, it is just used by Android AFAIK. > > I think it would be fine to write a draft that says how to use X.509 with EAT. It would involve https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-cose-x509-06 and maybe the URL you’ve suggested for finding the root. Would even be interested in adding this functionality to ctoken <https://github.com/laurencelundblade/ctoken>. > > Technically speaking, this is all about endorsements and relates to recent email threads on that subject here. > > LL > > >> On Apr 22, 2020, at 7:54 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com <mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> On 2020-04-22 16:38, Laurence Lundblade wrote: >>> Hi Anders, >> >> Hi Laurence, >> Thank you for responding! >> >>>> On Feb 27, 2020, at 9:51 AM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com <mailto:anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi List, >>>> In the https://cyberphone.github.io/openbankingwallet project the idea was to use attestations. The most recent version of the Android app indeed supports this as well. >>>> >>>> In an ideal world the root would be provided by Google. However, since we don't live in an ideal world there are vendors out there who do not follow that "recipe”. >>> Are you referring to Android N Key Attestation that is implemented in the key store? >> >> This is indeed one possible usage. >> https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation >> >>>> >>>> For W3C's PaymentRequest API a simpler solution is used which do not match attestations but is better than nothing. This scheme builds on publishing a manifest associated with the app. Here is my particular manifest: https://mobilepki.org/w3cpay/method >>>> >>>> But I still would like to use attestations and also not being tied to browsers. >>>> >>>> What about making attestations optionally contain a URL to the root like https://huawei.com/teeroot ? >>> I don’t know what https://huawei.com/teeroot is. I can’t get anything from this URL. >> >> That's correct, I don't even know where to find Huawei's attestation root which is how I came to this idea :) >> >> >>> I’m guessing you are after an X.509 root certificate, one that is used for Android-style attestation. Is that right? >> >> Right. Is using an X.509 root certificate an unusual way of dealing with attestation verification? >> >> Anders >> >>> LL >>>> Since the number of vendors in finite and the Web-PKI is in a fairly good shape these days, this could serve as a workaround for those who don't have any number of cycles to spend on installing arbitrary tee root certificates. That is, a verifier's "trust registry" would simply hold host names like "huawei.com", "sony.com", "samsung.com", etc. >>>> >>>> If there is a better method, I'm all ears! >>>> >>>> thanx, >>>> Anders >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> RATS mailing list >>>> RATS@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats >> >> >
- [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Anders Rundgren
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Anders Rundgren
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Laurence Lundblade
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Anders Rundgren
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Laurence Lundblade
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Anders Rundgren
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Eliot Lear
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Laurence Lundblade
- Re: [Rats] Dealing with Attestation Roots Laurence Lundblade