[Rats] Re: qualifying "confidential computing" (was: Re: Re: Threat model and properties for remote attestation)

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 19 August 2026 15:55 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Henri Sirkkavaara <hello@vaara.io>, rats <rats@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Rats] Re: qualifying "confidential computing" (was: Re: Re: Threat model and properties for remote attestation)
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Henri Sirkkavaara <hello@vaara.io> wrote:
    > Passport is also wrong. In passport the Verifier signs an Attestation
    > Result and the Attester carries it to the Relying Party, so the RP
    > accepts the Verifier's authority. In our flow there is no signed Result
    > to carry. The RP recomputes the record's own signature and the digest
    > binding itself, which makes it its own Verifier over supplied
    > Evidence. That is a third shape, and I should have described it instead
    > of reaching for the nearest named model.

1) That's an RP with a co-located Verifier.
2) That's what we had pre-9334, and it encourages monopolies.

    > There are two honest routes from here. Keep it unprotected and stop
    > calling it an EAR, or sign it as a real EAR and keep the digest binding
    > underneath, where the signature becomes a convenience rather than the
    > trust root. I am taking the first, because signing reintroduces the
    > assertion I was trying to remove.

It sounds like UCCS, but it also sounds like everything that people were
worried that UCCS would be applied to insecurely.

It doesn't sound like remote attestation at all to me.


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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