[RPSEC] about the charter and work items

sandy@tislabs.com Thu, 22 June 2006 15:12 UTC

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Subject: [RPSEC] about the charter and work items
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Russ said that he was going to check about the status of charter changes.
I'd like also to mention one possible additional work item.  At the
mike at the last IETF, I mentioned taking on the draft that looks at
damage if MD5 is broken.  The response was that this was probably the
OSPF vulnerability analysis mentioned in the slides.  (Unfortunately,
this comment was too small to make it to the minutes, so I'm working
off memory here.)

But I was speaking of draft-manral-rpsec-existing-crypto-02.txt,
not the recently announced draft-ietf-rpsec-ospf-vuln-02.txt

I believe that there is value in looking at the damage to various
protocols that use keyed MD5 as an authentication mechanism - as an
impetus to change and as a warning to operators while MD5 is still used.
So I'm in favor of taking on the Manral draft.

Comments?

--Sandy

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