Re: [rtcweb] Security architecture: Making ECDSA mandatory

If there's something in particular you'd like to see, a pull request would
be a great way to indicate that.

-Ekr

On Sun, Jun 12, 2016 at 2:19 AM, Michael Davey <md84419@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On 25 May 2016 at 16:10, Michael Davey <md84419@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > I would recommend referencing IETF BCP 195.  The comments about ECDHE
> in that document (and of course the wider issues with weak DH key exchange)
> may also be noteworthy.
>
> There is still no mention of BCP 195 in the -12 document.  The
> recommendations of BCP 195 with regards to ECDHE aren't reflected in the
> -12 document.
>
> --
> Michael
>
>
> On 9 June 2016 at 18:29, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>
>> I believe it’s in the newly posted -12 version:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch
>>
>> spt
>>
>> > On Jun 09, 2016, at 10:08, Bernard Aboba <bernard.aboba@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > It should be merged.
>> >
>> > On May 25, 2016, at 03:03, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> In my search for status on ECDSA (we're in the process of switching
>> the Chrome default), I came across this in the current draft:
>> >>
>> >>    All implementations MUST implement DTLS 1.0, with the cipher suite
>> >>    TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and the DTLS-SRTP protection
>> >>    profile SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80.  Implementations SHOULD
>> >>    implement DTLS 1.2 with the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>> >>    cipher suite.  Implementations SHOULD favor cipher suites which
>> >>    support PFS over non-PFS cipher suites and GCM over CBC cipher
>> >>    suites.  [[OPEN ISSUE: Should we require ECDSA?  Waiting for WG
>> >>    Consensus.]]
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I also found Martin's PR. It's 11 months old, still open.
>> >>
>> >> Can we merge this now?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On 06/13/2015 12:06 AM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>> >>> I've opened https://github.com/rtcweb-wg/security-arch/pull/33
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> This changes the MTI cipher suites to ECDSA and does a little cleanup
>> >>> on the corresponding API requirements to more closely match what has
>> >>> just landed in the W3C specification.
>> >>>
>> >>> We discussed ECDSA and the only concerns raised were with
>> >>> compatibility.  I've done some testing with other implementations with
>> >>> no issues, and ECDSA seems to be well supported on all those
>> >>> hard-to-upgrade PSTN gateways (thanks to Cullen and Ethan for helping
>> >>> out with checks there and to NIST for creating certification pressure
>> >>> with FIPS-2).
>> >>>
>> >>> I have an implementation that switches Firefox to ECDSA with P-256 by
>> >>> default.  It's much, much faster.
>> >>> http://bench.cr.yp.to/
>> >>>  claims that
>> >>> it's 150 times faster on mobile devices for keygen.
>> >>>
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> rtcweb mailing list
>> >>>
>> >>> rtcweb@ietf.org
>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> rtcweb mailing list
>> >> rtcweb@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > rtcweb mailing list
>> > rtcweb@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> rtcweb mailing list
>> rtcweb@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> rtcweb mailing list
> rtcweb@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtcweb
>
>