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Re: [rtcweb] Security architecture: Making ECDSA mandatory

Randell Jesup <randell-ietf@jesup.org> Thu, 09 June 2016 06:53 UTC

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From: Randell Jesup <randell-ietf@jesup.org>
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Subject: Re: [rtcweb] Security architecture: Making ECDSA mandatory
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On 5/25/2016 6:03 AM, Harald Alvestrand wrote:
> In my search for status on ECDSA (we're in the process of switching 
> the Chrome default), I came across this in the current draft:
>
>     All implementations MUST implement DTLS 1.0, with the cipher suite
>     TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and the DTLS-SRTP protection
>     profile SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80.  Implementations SHOULD
>     implement DTLS 1.2 with the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
>     cipher suite.  Implementations SHOULD favor cipher suites which
>     support PFS over non-PFS cipher suites and GCM over CBC cipher
>     suites.  [[OPEN ISSUE: Should we require ECDSA?  Waiting for WG
>     Consensus.]]
>
> I also found Martin's PR. It's 11 months old, still open.
>
> Can we merge this now?

PLEASE :-)  Is there any objection at all?  If not, let's do it ASAP.

>
>
> On 06/13/2015 12:06 AM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>> I've openedhttps://github.com/rtcweb-wg/security-arch/pull/33


-- 
Randell Jesup -- rjesup a t mozilla d o t com
Please please please don't email randell-ietf@jesup.org!  Way too much spam

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