Re: [rtcweb] New use-case proposed

+1

I have provided the CPU requirements for doing SRTP re-encryption before.
Bottom line, on the real conferencing service encryption adds about 10%
extra CPU load. There is no benefit in compromising security to avoid
re-encrypting.
_____________
Roman Shpount

On Fri, May 11, 2012 at 12:21 PM, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>wrote:

> I propose to reject this use case because it requires yet another security
> redesign.
> The clue is here:
>
>
>> - The keying solution must allow each participants to encrypt to
>> multiple receivers without any decryption+encryption in the middle node
>>
>>
> This means that each participant must use the same encryption keys to all
> other participants; this in turn means that when someone leaves the group,
> all participants must change their encryption keys; it also means that as
> long as shared keys are used for authentication, all participants can
> impersonate all other participants.
>
> In fact, this solution has most of the issues (except for the network
> layer deployment issue) that leads me to strongly advocate leaving
> multicast out of scope for this effort.
>
>               Harald
>
>
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