Re: Optimizing Authentication - periodic re-authentication

Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com> Tue, 30 January 2024 12:03 UTC

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Subject: Re: Optimizing Authentication - periodic re-authentication
From: Alan DeKok <aland@deployingradius.com>
In-Reply-To: <20240128202100.GA11839@pfrc.org>
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 07:03:39 -0500
Cc: draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication@ietf.org, rtg-bfd@ietf.org
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To: Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>
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On Jan 28, 2024, at 3:21 PM, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
> There's at least two possible ways to address this:
> 1. We simply don't worry about periodic re-auth for no-auth or NULL-auth.
> We thus don't protect against this attack.  If you care about this attack,
> use Meticulous Keyed ISAAC and the attack goes away.
> 2. We test periodic strong authentication by using a Poll sequence.  If we
> don't receive a Fin within the Detect Interval with strong auth, compromise
> should be expected.

  I think that the recommendation should be "if not using strong authentication or ISAAC, then periodically use poll mode".

> [1] Yes... the only attack we have in this mode is "keep the session Up when
> it might otherwise not be".  I expect the usual hilarity when we get to
> security area review.

  Not all attacks have negative effects.

  I'm reminded of a "buffer overflow" report from many years ago for some of my software.  The overflow wasn't a network-based overflow, which would have been worrying.  Instead, the report was "it is possible to create configuration file data which results in overflow, which can make the software do things".

  I think it took about 4 rounds before I manage to get it through that if an attacker can write to the configuration files, he can just *configure* the software to do something.  He doesn't need to "exploit" it with an overflow.

  I that hope that the secdir review can avoid commenting on useless and irrelevant attacks.

  Alan DeKok.