Re: Optimizing Authentication - periodic re-authentication

Rahman <reshad@yahoo.com> Tue, 30 January 2024 05:31 UTC

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From: Rahman <reshad@yahoo.com>
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Subject: Re: Optimizing Authentication - periodic re-authentication
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 21:28:45 -0800
Message-Id: <2A54BB75-B967-425C-B3B4-39A3A91BE4B0@yahoo.com>
References: <20240128202100.GA11839@pfrc.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication@ietf.org, rtg-bfd@ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20240128202100.GA11839@pfrc.org>
To: Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org>
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Jeff, good catch.

We can document both ways, ie we can let implementations decide which of the 2 methods below they prefer? Or is the concern that this will cause a DISCUSS?

Regards,
Reshad.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 28, 2024, at 12:21 PM, Jeffrey Haas <jhaas@pfrc.org> wrote:
> 
> Optimizing Auth Authors and Working Group,
> 
> The text on github is coming along, thanks.  Much of the work has been
> toward resolving procedural discussions vs. the secure sequence numbers
> draft.  While doing my latest review, it occurred to me that the periodic
> reauthentication procedure is perhaps flawed.
> 
> When running in the optimized mode, authentication may be disabled, the new
> NULL auth type, or Meticulous Keyed ISAAC.  For disabled or NULL, the intent
> of periodic re-authentication was to address active attacks on the Up
> portion of the session.[1]
> 
> The procedures have a BFD implementation periodically sending out
> authenticated control packets.  However, there's no way in the current
> procedures to synchronize that the receiver of those packets should expect
> authentication.
> 
> Thus, it's possible for an active attacker to simply drop the strong
> authentication packets and simply continue to inject either the
> unathenticated packets, or the next expected sequence numbers in the NULL
> auth mode.
> 
> There's at least two possible ways to address this:
> 1. We simply don't worry about periodic re-auth for no-auth or NULL-auth.
> We thus don't protect against this attack.  If you care about this attack,
> use Meticulous Keyed ISAAC and the attack goes away.
> 2. We test periodic strong authentication by using a Poll sequence.  If we
> don't receive a Fin within the Detect Interval with strong auth, compromise
> should be expected.
> 
> 
> -- Jeff
> 
> [1] Yes... the only attack we have in this mode is "keep the session Up when
> it might otherwise not be".  I expect the usual hilarity when we get to
> security area review.
>