Re: [saag] Ubiquitous Encryption: content filtering

[Natasha Rooney <[e-mail]>]

Apologies for the late response, I was away for a week. I have an amendment to the Content Filtering suggestion:

I had a comment to remove the "mobile" from "mobile networks" in the submission; which I am fine to do but am not sure if content filtering is done in the same way on all networks. If so, then the mobile can be removed! I just ran through the other emails and I don’t think anyone else asked a question, if this is incorrect please let me know!


Natasha


Natasha Rooney | Web Technologist | GSMA | [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> | [phone] | @thisNatasha | Skype: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Tokyo, Japan


On Jun 24, 2015, at 4:32 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

Responding to various parts of the thread:

Q: What is the difference between filtering and censorship?
A: The person who decides to impose it.

Filtering is actually an essential tool for use of the modern Internet. Without filtering there is no mechanism to control abuse.

Today I received five junk calls. The time is rapidly approaching when I get rid of the telephone line completely. There is simply too much spam.

The fact that the Russian Business Network has put a machine on the net does not mean that any machine I own need be able to connect to it. I don't want their IP address to be reachable, I don't want their DNS names to resolve.

So the ability to perform filtering is an essential part of every end-to-end encryption mechanism. But giving control over that filtering to the government is not. When I was at university there was a club for thugs who went round smashing up restaurants for fun. One of the members of that club is now the UK Prime Minister. I am damned if I am going to let the likes of him decide what anyone can access.

The question is who has control and who is empowered.

I am firmly of the opinion that ubiquitous end-to-end encryption is only viable if it is accompanied by a robust and easy to use mechanism that allows for a gap in the stack. If I publish a key for [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]> it will be the key of a service in the cloud that performs anti-malware filtering. Use of the end-to-end key will be reserved to people who are expressly authorized to use it.


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