[saag] Re: New I-D: draft-yossif-psea-01 — Post-Session Execution Assurance (authority gap at execution time)

Mohamad Khalil Yossif <mohamad@yuthent.com> Sun, 10 May 2026 10:09 UTC

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From: Mohamad Khalil Yossif <mohamad@yuthent.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, saag@ietf.org
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Subject: [saag] Re: New I-D: draft-yossif-psea-01 — Post-Session Execution Assurance (authority gap at execution time)
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Michael, list,

Thank you - this is a useful frame. Three points.

On biometric reliability in 2026. The Swedish researcher's work likely reflects the 2013-2017 era of attacks (Touch ID via dental molds, Face ID via 3D masks, Galaxy via printed photos). The current state is meaningfully different. Apple Platform Security (March 2026) reports a Face ID false match rate of 1 in 1,000,000 with single-appearance enrollment, and Elcomsoft - a forensics vendor whose business is breaking iPhones for law enforcement - reports no reproducible Face ID circumvention in the wild. On Android, the CDD now defines Class 3 biometrics with SAR (spoof acceptance rate) at or below 7%, gated by hardware-backed StrongBox keystore on Pixel 4+ and Samsung S20+. Class 3 is the only tier permitted to back FIDO2 and Keystore-protected keys.

PSEA does not assume biometric infallibility. The model assumes the modern hardware trust anchor (Secure Enclave on iOS, StrongBox on Android) plus liveness detection plus per-action cryptographic binding. The composition is the security property, not any single component. An attacker who defeats one layer - even biometric spoofing - still has to forge a hardware-bound signature over the specific action payload, which the trust anchor refuses to produce without a fresh successful biometric match against the enrolled template, on a device whose state passes attestation, at the moment of the action.

On FIDO scanner attestation. You're right that FIDO has mature work on attesting biometric subsystems at enrollment time. The gap PSEA targets is at execution. FIDO authenticator attestation answers "is this scanner genuine when the credential was created." PSEA requires the artifact at every sensitive action to bind: (a) the specific enrolled biometric template that approved this action, (b) the specific action payload, and (c) the specific moment - producible by the trust anchor without any verifier in the loop. Whether that gap is best closed inside FIDO, W3C webauthn, as a RATS extension, or as a free-standing model is genuinely open.

On the SDK. We have working iOS and Android SDKs that implement the model end-to-end. Building them surfaced a set of threat-model questions the public draft does not yet treat in depth - and which I'd genuinely value your view on, since they sit closer to your area than mine:

  1. Device lifecycle continuity. How does the relying party gain confidence that the device the proof is generated on is still under the control of the same human across the device's lifecycle? Re-enrollment events, Touch ID / Face ID re-registration, OS updates that re-bind keys to a new attestation root, ownership transfer, and family-sharing scenarios all break the naive "device = enrolled human" assumption. We handle some of these via attestation-state hash chaining and forced re-enrollment, but the threat model around silent re-binding events is not fully closed.

  2. Single human presence on a shared device. The WebAuthn L2 §6 quote you'll know - "the same user might not always be the same natural person" - applies in practice to family iPhones, shared workstations in healthcare, and shift-based banking terminals. UVI exists as an extension for differentiating templates, but is not implemented in any production WebAuthn client. PSEA needs to express that the proof was produced by the specific enrolled template, not by any UV-passing human on the device. The cleanest mechanism we've found is template-binding via a hash of the enrolled biometric reference, but this collides with platform privacy guarantees that templates never leave the enclave.

  3. Theft, remote control, and injection. The two attack classes that worry me most: (a) live device coercion / hijacking - the legitimate human is present and biometrics pass, but the action being signed was injected by malware between the user's intent and the trust anchor's signing operation; (b) remote-control scenarios where an attacker drives the UI while the legitimate human is watching, believing they approved one action while the signed payload represents another. We mitigate via canonical action display in the trust anchor's secure UI plus action-hash binding, but the injection vector inside the OS layer between the app and the secure UI is the part I'd most welcome scrutiny on.

These are the kinds of questions I'd rather have answered before -02 than after. If you have intuitions on any of the three - even rough ones - I'd value them. The first two are partially addressed by existing FIDO/W3C work; the third I genuinely don't see addressed cleanly anywhere.

Mohamad Khalil-Yossif
Yuthent
mohamad@yuthent.com
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yossif-psea/ [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yossif-psea/]


[Mohamad Khalil Yossif]
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On 10/05/2026 00:08:49, Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> wrote:

mohamad@yuthent.com wrote:
> If an Attester in RATS terms cannot, by charter, be a natural person,
> and if WebAuthn UV explicitly disclaims concrete user identification —
> where do you see the cleanest home for a model that requires the proof
> artifact to bind a specific natural person, a specific action, and a
> specific moment?

I believe that neither Attesters nor Target Environment can be natural
persons due to the inability of natural persons to execute digital signature
operations, whether legacy (disco-era) ones, or any of the current quantum
safe ones. I don't think this is a RATS *charter* limitation, but one of
physics and human physiology.


When biometrics first arrived, I wondered if there was a way for people to
identify themselves in such a way that survived amnesia, diminished
consciousness, and yet was not subject to duress. My ideas were silly, and
best shared over beer. I later met a hacker/scientist (from Sweden I think)
whose job it was to break biometric systems... the news then was not good.

> Is this best pursued as a RATS extension that adds a
> "human attestation" claim type (composing with existing device claims),
> as a FIDO Alliance high-assurance profile, as a joint W3C/FIDO/IETF
> effort, or as something the existing standards genuinely do not need to
> address because the use case can be solved at deployment time by
> relying parties enforcing single-template enrollment plus UVI-style
> checking?

I don't know. I don't know what technology you are proposing.
Your document is an interesting requirements statement.

Your section, "What PSEA Is Not" is interesting.
I would say, what you need is all of what you described.

If one believed that fingerprints were the way to go (they probably aren't),
then what is possible today is to assess trusthworthiness in the fingerprint
scanning system (hardware, firmware).

My understanding is that is occuring today if various forms, and there are
FIDO Alliance specifications relating to remote attestation of such scanners,
and therefore incorporation of the resulting trustworthiness claim into the
credential that either derived from the biometrics of the fingerprint, or
which the fingerprint unlocks. (I think both occur, but it's not my
expertise)

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