[saag] New I-D: draft-yossif-psea-01 — Post-Session Execution Assurance (authority gap at execution time)

"mohamad@yuthent.com, mohamad@yuthent.com" <mohamad@yuthent.com> Fri, 08 May 2026 07:33 UTC

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Date: Fri, 08 May 2026 10:32:22 +0300
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Subject: [saag] New I-D: draft-yossif-psea-01 — Post-Session Execution Assurance (authority gap at execution time)
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List,

I have submitted an Informational Internet-Draft defining a security model for verifying human authority at execution time:

  draft-yossif-psea-01
  Post-Session Execution Assurance (PSEA): A Security Model for Verifying Authority at the Moment of Action
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yossif-psea/

The problem statement: session-based security conflates authentication (who logged in) with execution authority (who is approving this specific action right now). In banking, healthcare, government, and critical infrastructure, this gap enables fraud and unauthorized execution within technically valid sessions.

PSEA defines five requirements that an implementation must satisfy to close this gap:
  1. Authority validated at the moment of execution, not at login
  2. Human presence demonstrated, not inferred from prior authentication
  3. Execution approval bound to a verified device state
  4. Cryptographic proof independent of session tokens or bearer credentials
  5. Proof generation independent of network connectivity

The model is intentionally agnostic to biometric modality, cryptographic scheme, and attestation mechanism. It defines what must be proven, not how.

A reference specification is maintained at https://github.com/yuthent/psea-spec and includes:
  - Formal P/S/E/A tier definitions
  - JSON Schema for the proof token
  - STRIDE-based threat model
  - OpenAPI 3.0 verification contract
  - RFC 6979 deterministic test vectors (20 vectors, 4 tiers)
  - Reference verifiers in Python and TypeScript

The draft explicitly distinguishes PSEA from MFA, continuous authentication, session hardening, risk-based authentication, and Zero Trust — each of which addresses a different problem.

I am seeking technical review and critique, specifically:
  - Whether the problem definition is sound and the gap is genuinely unaddressed by existing models
  - Whether the five conformance requirements in Appendix B are technically sufficient
  - Whether the threat model in the reference spec correctly characterizes the attack surface
  - Whether this warrants a dedicated BOF or fits within an existing WG charter

Mohamad Khalil Yossif
Yuthent
mohamad@yuthent.com
https://yuthent.com/psea


	
Mohamad Khalil Yossif
CEO – Yuthent
Founder – SwiftCrew, MK Digital, MK Electronics

 
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