Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Fixed.  Thanks.

On Sep 4, 2015, at 9:41 AM, Derek Atkins wrote:

> One spelling nit:
> 
> Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> writes:
> 
>> I'm trying to address both comments with this proposal:
>> 
>> 2.6.  Preserving Interoperability
>> 
>>   Cryptographic algorithm deprecation is very difficult.  People do not
>>   like to introduce interoperability problems, even to preserve
>>   security.  As a result, flawed algorithms are supported for far too
>>   long.  The impact of legacy software and long support tails on
>>   security can be reduced by making it easy to transition from old
>>   algorithms and suites to new ones.  Social pressure is often needed
>>   to cause the transition to happen.
>> 
>>   Implementers have been reluctant to remove deprecated algorithms or
>>   suites from server software, and server administrators have been
>>   reluctant to diable them over concerns that some party will no longer
> --------------------^
> 
> This should be "disable", not "diable".
> 
>>   have the ability to connect to their server.  Implementers and
>>   administrators want to improve security by using the best supported
>>   algorithms, but their actions are tempered by the desire to preserve
>>   connectivity.  Recently, some browser vendors have started to provide
>>   visual warnings when a deprecated algorithm or suite is used.  These
>>   visual warnings provide a new incentive to transition away from
>>   deprecated algorithms and suites.
>> 
>>   Transition in Internet infrastructure is particularly difficult.  The
>>   digital signature on the certificate for an intermediate
>>   certification authority (CA) [RFC5280] is often expected to last
>>   decades, which hinders the transition away from a weak signature
>>   algorithm or short key length.  Once a long-lived certificate is
>>   issued with a particular signature algorithm, that algorithm will be
>>   used by many relying parties, and none of them can stop supporting it
>>   without invalidating all of the subordinate certificates.  In a
>>   hierarchical system, many subordinate certificates could be impacted
>>   by the decision to drop support for a weak signature algorithm or an
>>   associated hash function.
>> 
>>   Institutions, being large or dominant users within a large user base,
>>   can assist by coordinating the demise of an algorithm suite, making
>>   the transition easier for their own users as well as others.
>> 
>> Russ
> 
> -derek
> 
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>> 
>> 
> 
> -- 
>       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
>       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
>       Computer and Internet Security Consultant