Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06

Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> Fri, 04 September 2015 13:41 UTC

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
References: <55A938F1.9090404@cs.tcd.ie> <20150720044849.GY28047@mournblade.imrryr.org> <B866063D-C1A8-4286-83E1-9EBAE7994297@vigilsec.com> <55E83554.6010808@cisco.com> <62CBD9E2-2DB4-4D3D-93E5-ADEB0F3D3C12@vigilsec.com>
Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2015 09:41:27 -0400
In-Reply-To: <62CBD9E2-2DB4-4D3D-93E5-ADEB0F3D3C12@vigilsec.com> (Russ Housley's message of "Thu, 3 Sep 2015 16:30:44 -0400")
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Subject: Re: [saag] AD review of draft-iab-crypto-alg-agility-06
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One spelling nit:

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>; writes:

> I'm trying to address both comments with this proposal:
>
> 2.6.  Preserving Interoperability
>
>    Cryptographic algorithm deprecation is very difficult.  People do not
>    like to introduce interoperability problems, even to preserve
>    security.  As a result, flawed algorithms are supported for far too
>    long.  The impact of legacy software and long support tails on
>    security can be reduced by making it easy to transition from old
>    algorithms and suites to new ones.  Social pressure is often needed
>    to cause the transition to happen.
>
>    Implementers have been reluctant to remove deprecated algorithms or
>    suites from server software, and server administrators have been
>    reluctant to diable them over concerns that some party will no longer
--------------------^

This should be "disable", not "diable".

>    have the ability to connect to their server.  Implementers and
>    administrators want to improve security by using the best supported
>    algorithms, but their actions are tempered by the desire to preserve
>    connectivity.  Recently, some browser vendors have started to provide
>    visual warnings when a deprecated algorithm or suite is used.  These
>    visual warnings provide a new incentive to transition away from
>    deprecated algorithms and suites.
>
>    Transition in Internet infrastructure is particularly difficult.  The
>    digital signature on the certificate for an intermediate
>    certification authority (CA) [RFC5280] is often expected to last
>    decades, which hinders the transition away from a weak signature
>    algorithm or short key length.  Once a long-lived certificate is
>    issued with a particular signature algorithm, that algorithm will be
>    used by many relying parties, and none of them can stop supporting it
>    without invalidating all of the subordinate certificates.  In a
>    hierarchical system, many subordinate certificates could be impacted
>    by the decision to drop support for a weak signature algorithm or an
>    associated hash function.
>
>    Institutions, being large or dominant users within a large user base,
>    can assist by coordinating the demise of an algorithm suite, making
>    the transition easier for their own users as well as others.
>
> Russ

-derek

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-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant