[Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt]

Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Tue, 03 February 2009 19:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 19:47:23 +0000
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt]
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This is a preview of how SCRAM as GS2 document might look like. I think 
it should have enough details for people to make a decision between 
stand-alone SCRAM and SCRAM as GS2 (or to raise questions that should be 
sufficient to make such choice.)

--- Begin Message ---
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.

	Title           : Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) SASL Mechanism (GS2 variant)
	Author(s)       : A. Menon-Sen, et al.
	Filename        : draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2009-02-03

The secure authentication mechanism most widely deployed and used by
 Internet application protocols is the transmission of clear-text
 passwords over a channel protected by Transport Layer Security
 (TLS).  There are some significant security concerns with that
 mechanism, which could be addressed by the use of a challenge
 response authentication mechanism protected by TLS. Unfortunately,
 the challenge response mechanisms presently on the standards track
 all fail to meet requirements necessary for widespread deployment,
 and have had success only in limited use.

 This specification describes a family of authentication mechanisms
 called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
 (SCRAM), which addresses the security concerns and meets the
 deployability requirements. When used in combination with TLS or an
 equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this family could
 improve the status-quo for application protocol authentication and
 provide a suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement mechanism for
 future application protocol standards.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt"><ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt>
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--- End Message ---