[Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt]
Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Tue, 03 February 2009 19:59 UTC
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Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2009 19:47:23 +0000
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt]
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This is a preview of how SCRAM as GS2 document might look like. I think it should have enough details for people to make a decision between stand-alone SCRAM and SCRAM as GS2 (or to raise questions that should be sufficient to make such choice.)
--- Begin Message ---A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) SASL Mechanism (GS2 variant) Author(s) : A. Menon-Sen, et al. Filename : draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt Pages : 20 Date : 2009-02-03 The secure authentication mechanism most widely deployed and used by Internet application protocols is the transmission of clear-text passwords over a channel protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS). There are some significant security concerns with that mechanism, which could be addressed by the use of a challenge response authentication mechanism protected by TLS. Unfortunately, the challenge response mechanisms presently on the standards track all fail to meet requirements necessary for widespread deployment, and have had success only in limited use. This specification describes a family of authentication mechanisms called the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM), which addresses the security concerns and meets the deployability requirements. When used in combination with TLS or an equivalent security layer, a mechanism from this family could improve the status-quo for application protocol authentication and provide a suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement mechanism for future application protocol standards. A URL for this Internet-Draft is: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft.ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt"><ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.txt>_______________________________________________ I-D-Announce mailing list I-D-Announce@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt--- End Message ---
- [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-00.t… Alexey Melnikov
- Re: [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-… Hallvard B Furuseth
- Re: [Fwd: I-D Action:draft-newman-auth-scram-gs2-… Simon Josefsson