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Re: [secdir] secdir review draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt-08

"Rakesh Gandhi (rgandhi)" <rgandhi@cisco.com> Fri, 10 February 2017 14:43 UTC

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From: "Rakesh Gandhi (rgandhi)" <rgandhi@cisco.com>
To: Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt.all@ietf.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: secdir review draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt-08
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Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 14:43:28 +0000
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Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt-08
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Hi Leif,

Thanks for your reply. Please see inline <RG> …


On 2017-02-10, 9:22 AM, "Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se> wrote:

    On 2017-02-10 14:28, Rakesh Gandhi (rgandhi) wrote:
    > Hi Leif,
    > 
    > Thank you for the review of the document. 
    > 
    > RFC 4736 (basis for this document), Security Section 9, has coverage for this aspect – “Furthermore, a head-end LSR may decide to ignore explicit notification coming from a mid-point residing in another domain.”
    > 
    
    Ah ok so trust is placed in the domain? I guess that property is
    something that could be made explicit in the security considerations
    (or maybe its obvious to people in the field)
    

<RG> Yes, this and other considerations are covered in the referenced RFCs (RFC 4736 and RFC 5920).

Thanks,
Rakesh


    > Thanks,
    > Rakesh
    > 
    > 
    > On 2017-02-10, 2:30 AM, "Leif Johansson" <leifj@sunet.se> wrote:
    > 
    >     
    >     Reviewer: Leif Johansson
    >     Review result: Minor issues
    >     
    >     I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
    >     ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
    >     IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
    >     security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
    >     these comments just like any other last call comments.
    >     
    >     The draft describes a way to handle groupings of large sets of sub-
    >     LSPs in a P2MP GMPLS setup for the purpose of traffic engineering
    >     (re-)optimization by introducing the concept of "fragment identifiers"
    >     
    >     Let me state up front that the topic is outside my normal area of
    >     expertise. My only question is this: could an attacker fake messages
    >     that would (to the receiver ingress node) appear to be part of a
    >     fragmented group of sub-LSPs so as to trigger a full re-computation
    >     of the tree? The text in the last but one paragraph of 4.2 would
    >     seem to suggest that this attack is a possibility. At "worst" this
    >     would be a denial-of-service attack but it should perhaps be addressed
    >     in the security considerations section anyway.
    >     	
    >     	Cheers Leif
    >     
    >

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