[secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01

"Xialiang (Frank)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> Wed, 01 July 2015 01:29 UTC

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From: "Xialiang (Frank)" <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
To: "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth.all@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01
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Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 01:29:18 +0000
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-bmwg-issu-meth-01
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comment.

This draft specifies a set of common methodologies and procedures designed to characterize the overall behavior of a Device Under Test (DUT), subject to an ISSU event.

I have the following comments:

1.       Should the ISSU test methodology include the verification and test when the DUT is under network DDoS attacks?

2.       In the software download stage, in addition to compatibility checks and verification of checksums, we should also explicitly mention that the device should verify the authenticity and integrity of its download. I.e. verify signatures on signed code and OCSP/CRL for the used signature. And that a system must not load unverified code;

3.       even in a test environment all deployed software components must be verified (e.g. using signatures);

4.       Nits: this draft has expired on May-30, 2015

Recommendation:  Ready With Issues

B.R.
Frank