Re: [secdir] draft-shiomoto-ccamp-switch-programming-05

[Tom Yu <[e-mail]>]

Rob Austein <[e-mail]> writes:

> The kicker here is the definition of "safe".  As the subject is
> traffic engineering, loss of money and data are of course issues, but
> the more disturbing issue is that (according to the authors -- I have
> no reason to disbelieve them but have not independently verified this)
> there is a risk of bodily harm to "service personnel", because, for
> some of the technologies that use this protocol, deciding to start
> sending data equates to turning on lasers.

I am not inclined to believe that this physical safety issue is
severe.  Having worked with lasers, though not network equipment that
uses them, I can say that good general laser safety practices should
substantially reduce the risk of injury to personnel.  (e.g., safety
eyewear; treating any aperture, fiber, etc. that is capable of
emitting a laser beam as if it could do so at any moment; putting beam
stops in place to protect against accidental exposure; etc.)

IMHO, if the physical safety of your personnel relies substantially on
the good behavior of some person or equipment located possibly
thousands of miles away, your industrial hygiene program could use
some improvement.

It may be that prevailing practices in the industry are not as
conservative, such that the advice about physical safety due to
unexpected laser activation is warranted.  (Are there operators here
who could comment?)  From a risk management perspective, I think it
would be better for an operator to institute better laser safety
practices locally.  I believe optical patch panels with integral beam
stops are available, for example.