Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Mon, 14 December 2015 15:39 UTC

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From: "Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: "Alejandro =?utf-8?b?UMOpcmV6IE3DqW5kZXo=?=" <alex@um.es>
Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 07:39:27 -0800
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml
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On 14 Dec 2015, at 4:46, Alejandro Pérez Méndez wrote:

> Hi Paul,
>
> thanks for the review. Please, see my comments inline.
>
>
> El 14/12/15 a las 04:57, Paul Hoffman escribió:
>> Greetings. I'm the SecDir reviewer for draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml. I 
>> apologize for the lateness of this review, particularly because I 
>> have what might be a significant question on the draft.
>>
>> The first two paragraphs of the Security Considerations section read:
>>
>> In this specification, the Relying Party MUST trust any statement in
>> the SAML messages from the IdP in the same way that it trusts
>> information contained in RADIUS attributes.  These entities MUST
>> trust the RADIUS infrastructure to provide integrity of the SAML
>> messages.
>>
>> Furthermore, the Relying Party MUST apply policy and filter the
>> information based on what information the IdP is permitted to assert
>> and on what trust is reasonable to place in proxies between them.
>>
>> These seem like pretty important considerations. I fully admit that I 
>> might have missed it, but are they actually mentioned earlier in the 
>> document? I would have expected them in the Introduction, or at least 
>> in Section 7.
>>
>> If those requirements are not listed early, shouldn't they be?
>
> You are right. We think that restating this consideration (first 
> paragraph) at the begging of section 4.2 would be a good idea. 
> Besides, it will serve as a better motivation for why using RADIUS 
> over TLS (or equivalent security means) is mandatory.
>
> Would that work for you?

Yes, I can see how it would fit there well. Thanks!

--Paul Hoffman