Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control-04
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sun, 07 June 2020 00:05 UTC
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Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2020 17:05:28 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com>
Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, Shawn Emery <semery@uccs.edu>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control-04
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Hi Shawn, Thanks for the review. I believe you're correct that any filter that filters monitoring agents would have to have been confiugred previously over the data channel, yes. -Ben On Fri, Jun 05, 2020 at 04:14:02PM -0600, Shawn Emery wrote: > Reviewer: Shawn M. Emery > Review result: Ready with nits > > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. > These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security > area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these > comments just like any other last call comments. > > This draft specifies a filter control through the Distributed > Denial-of-Service Open Threat > Signaling (DOTS) signal channel rather than through the data channel, given > that an active > DDoS attack would essentially disable the data channel. The assumption is > that the filter > rules would have been constructed and distributed during idle time, before > the attack. > > The security considerations section does exist and the defers to the base > RFCs, 8782 and 8783, for confidentiality and integrity requirements. The > draft > continues that the filtering rules should be constructed before any attack > through > the data channel. The section finishes with an attack by using the control > filter to > make a DDoS worse and recommends mitigation through operators monitoring > and countering malicious behavior. They describe this as only a variation > of the > attacks outlined in 8782 and 8783, though I wonder if a new attack vector is > introduced through an attacker enabling a filter that filters monitoring > agents? > However this would have had to have been configured through the data channel > priori, no? > > General comments: > > Thank you for the examples, this makes the concepts behind the draft more > clear. > > Editorial comments: > > ietf-dots-signal-channel and ietf-dots-data-channel are now RFCs. > > Shawn. > --
- [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-… Shawn Emery
- Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-fil… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-dots-signal-fil… mohamed.boucadair