Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04

I was discussing this just this morning with a colleague.

The discussion of pre-image and collision points out that using collisions 
as an attack on a routing protocol is not that easy since routing 
protocols have format requirements - the attacker would have to find a 
collision that is also a validly formatted protocol packet.

Even beyond that, if the authors can point to some damage an attacker 
could do in a routing protocol using a collision, that would be very 
interesting.

--Sandy

On Thu, 27 May 2010, Sam Hartman wrote:

>>>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> writes:
>
>    Nicolas> I have reviewed this document as part of the security
>    Nicolas> directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
>    Nicolas> being processed by the IESG. Document editors and WG chairs
>    Nicolas> should treat these comments just like any other last call
>    Nicolas> comments.
>
>    Nicolas> This document aims to be an Informational RFC describing
>    Nicolas> security problems with various routing protocols.
>
>    Nicolas> Aside from various spelling and other nits that the
>    Nicolas> RFC-Editor can easily handle, I have no issues with this
>    Nicolas> document and it is ready for publication.
>
> This document talks a lot about collision attacks against MD5 and then
> draws the conclusion that MD5 should not be used as part of a MAC.  I
> agree that it is prudent to provide alternatives to MD5.  However, I
> think the current text implies that collision attacks against MD5 are
> applicable to attacks against the use of MD5 in routing protocols.
>
> There is an introductory section that describes the difference between
> pre image and collision attacks, but the rest of the document seems to
> ignore the advice of that section.
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